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We investigate the current use of public revenues which are generated through both carbon taxes and
cap-and-trade systems. More than $28.3 billion in government “carbon revenues” are currently col-
lected each year in 40 countries and another 16 states or provinces around the world. Of those
revenues, 27% ($7.8 billion) are used to subsidize “green” spending in energy efﬁciency or renewable
energy; 26% ($7.4 billion) go toward state general funds; and 36% ($10.1 billion) are returned to
corporate or individual taxpayers through paired tax cuts or direct rebates. Cap-and-trade systems
($6.57 billion in total public revenue) earmark a larger share of revenues for “green” spending (70%),
while carbon tax systems ($21.7 billion) more commonly refund revenues or otherwise direct them
towards government general funds (72% of revenues). Drawing from an empirical dataset, we also
identify various trends in systems’ use of “carbon revenues” in terms of the total revenues collected
annually per capita in each jurisdiction and offer commensurate qualitative observations on carbon
policy design choices.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
For economists, political scientists, and policy analysts who
wish to put a price on carbon, the question of optimal carbon
pricing mechanisms has long been hotly debated. Some econo-
mists have argued for a direct carbon tax (Metcalf and Weisbach,
2009; Nordhaus, 2007) and others have advocated cap-and-trade
(Keohane, 2009; Stavins, 2007), while a third group has argued
that the two policies are functionally equivalent (i.e. that a given
cap-and-trade system can be designed to essentially mimic a
carbon tax, and vice versa; Aldy et al., 2010; de Mooij et al., 2012).
Policy design elements have been explored in depth conceptually
or through modeling exercises.r Ltd. This is an open access articleCarbon pricing is widely implemented across the globe today.
Furthermore, jurisdictions enacting carbon prices have often done
so for varied political and policy reasons which are not limited to
carbon pricing’s academic purpose of increasing the marginal cost
of greenhouse gas emissions to avoid anthropogenic climate
change (Harrison, 2013; Schatzki and Stavins, 2013). The emer-
gence of a global carbon pricing dataset leads to new opportunities
for comparative empirical analysis of policy dynamics and design
choices as they exist in the real world in order to better inform
conceptual understanding of these policies (Tables 1 and 2).
In particular, given growing interest in the United States in the
potential for carbon pricing revenue-neutrality to improve the
political prospects of broad-based climate policy in that country
(Parry et al., 2015; Shultz and Becker, 2013; Taylor, 2015), we have
chosen to investigate the use of public revenues which are gen-
erated through both carbon taxes and cap-and-trade systems. Our
examination of carbon-pricing revenues in all of the major
worldwide jurisdictions in which it is practiced suggests that theunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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policy.1
Reviewing government literature, we estimate that more than
$28.3 billion in government “carbon revenues” are currently col-
lected each year in 40 countries and another 16 states or provinces
around the world. Of those revenues, 27% ($7.8 billion) are used to
subsidize “green” spending in energy efﬁciency or renewable
energy,2 while 26% ($7.4 billion) go toward state general funds.
Notably, 36% ($10.1 billion) of today's carbon revenues–the largest
share overall–are returned to corporate or individual taxpayers
through paired tax cuts or direct rebates.
Our observations of carbon pricing in the real world suggest
that while the form of a carbon pricing system may be theoreti-
cally interchangeable in terms of incentivizing emission reduc-
tions, system form does seem to matter in terms of how revenues
are used. Namely, cap-and-trade systems earmark a larger share of
global revenues for additional “green” spending, while carbon tax
systems more commonly refund revenues or otherwise direct
them towards government general funds.2. Methodology
We estimated 2013 revenue collections and expenditures from
each global carbon pricing system operating at the state/provincial
level or above using government documents and secondary lit-
erature, as described in the individual country descriptions con-
tained in Appendices A and B. Expenditures were categorized into
three themes3:
(1) Green spending, which includes any form of government
spending on or subsidy toward (primarily) energy efﬁciency
and renewable energy research, development, and deploy-
ment, as well as other efforts intended to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions related to agriculture and forestry, landﬁll
management, alternative vehicles, and mass transit or tran-
sit-oriented development, as well as measures to adapt to
climate change. This category does not include all “green
spending” undertaken by a government with a carbon pricing
system, only that additional spending tied to carbon
revenues.
(2) General funds, where governments describe carbon revenues
as independent of any other public spending obligations, ex-
pressly contributing to general funds, or where the use of
carbon revenues is not otherwise speciﬁed and does not ap-
pear to be linked to particular spending programs.
(3) Revenue recycling, where carbon revenues are directly1 Policy discussions of global policies to price the emission of greenhouse gases
such as carbon dioxide, whether through direct taxes or indirect cap-and-trade
mechanisms, often focus on the desired effect of the new price–reduced emissions
by marginally increasing the cost of carbon-intensive energy consumption–rather
than the potentially substantial government revenues generated alongside. This
stands in contrast to Barthold’s (1994) observation that environmental excise taxes
(such as gas taxes or chemical fees) were historically used primarily as revenue
devices rather than incentives to change behavior. In this way, carbon taxes are
perhaps more similar to dual-purpose “ﬁscal-behavioral” sin taxes on alcohol and
tobacco products (with the “sin” in this case being carbon emissions).
2 This represented about 6.4% of 2013 global public subsidies toward renew-
able energy ($121 billion, according to the International Energy Agency). Mea-
surements of government spending on energy efﬁciency are both less precise and
subject to broad deﬁnitional variation; they can conservatively said to be on the
order of renewable subsidies, which would put carbon revenue spending at about
3% of the combined global total government “green spending” (IEA, 2013, 2014a,
2014b).
3 Total spending may not add up to 100% as not all spending is necessarily
captured by these three categories and on account of yearly discrepancies in carbon
revenue inﬂows versus expenditures (or, otherwise, formal fund designations).
Currencies are converted to nominal U. S. dollars at then-market exchange rates.returned to some broad portion of the population through
individual or business tax rate cuts, tax eliminations, or re-
bates in order to offset, in aggregate, the negative macro-
economic impacts of higher energy costs under a carbon price.
To meet the deﬁnition, revenue recycling should be carried
out independent of an individual's, corporation’s, or sector’s
cost of emitting carbon dioxide. We therefore do not include
free allocation of emission permits (for cap-and-trade sys-
tems) as a form of revenue recycling, nor do we count the use
of revenues for targeted industry assistance (for trade-exposed
or energy-intensive ﬁrms).4
We then compare each carbon pricing system’s revenue uses to
other system attributes, with a focus on system “revenue per ca-
pita” as a differentiating comparator. Revenue per capita is a useful
simpliﬁed indicator to understand the ﬁscal impact of a carbon-
pricing system in the aggregate; the incidence of policy costs may
actually be more narrow depending on system design, but revenue
per capita gives a sense for the policy’s overall burden. It is also
relatively direct compared to more commonly-used carbon policy
indicators such as price per ton of emissions, total emission cov-
erage, or reduction targets. The actual effects of any of those
measures are not consistent across implementation environments,
as they are ﬁltered through numerous other economic and design
variables before being felt.53. Results
3.1. Carbon cap-and-trade revenues
Carbon cap-and-trade systems raised about $6.57 billion glob-
ally in government revenues in 2013 through the sale of emission
permits created by public entities.6 State-run carbon permit auc-
tion and sales revenues alone therefore make cap and trade sys-
tems a signiﬁcant policy tool for revenue generation—23% of
overall global carbon revenues, and growing (despite the poor
salience of these revenues7 among the general populace). Of car-
bon cap and trade revenues, 70% are currently spent on “green”
subsidies such as support for energy efﬁciency or renewables,
while only 9% are directly returned to taxpayers or individual
consumers.
Unlike carbon taxes, which have a longer global track record owing
to their continued use in Scandinavian countries since the early 1990s,
carbon cap-and-trade systems have only been producing measurable
revenues for the last six or seven years. In some cases, such as the4 The reason is that both free allocation and industry assistance are tied to
speciﬁc emitter characteristics and more akin, respectively, to selectively lowering
the original carbon price (where the government never sees the revenues) or
buying off political opposition to the carbon pricing policy (Markussen and
Svendsen, 2005). It is arguable that such interventions could in fact be regarded as
a form of arms-length “spending” by governments for which it would be politically
untenable to actually ﬁrst take possession of these lost revenues; the implications
of such arrangements are left to further study.
5 Far more precise economic effects of carbon pricing policies are generally
estimated through complex economy-speciﬁc modeling exercises. See for example,
computable general equilibrium (CGE)-based efforts by Meng et al. (2013) for the
Australian carbon tax, and comments therein regarding public skepticism of si-
milarly advanced modeling undertaken by the Australian Treasury.
6 This ﬁgure is for direct cash receipts does not include the implicit value of
carbon permits granted by the state to emitters through grandfathering or other
free allocation; it also does not include the value of emission permits generated
through offsets or other peer-to-peer trading.
7 For example, a recent survey of California residents found that 87% of re-
spondents had heard “nothing” or just “a little” about the state's cap-and-trade
program, which began generating government revenues later that year, and that
65% had “very little” or “no” conﬁdence in the state's government to use that money
wisely (Baldassare et al., 2012).
Table 1
Global cap-and-trade system revenues.
Cap and trade systems Annual revenue
(millions)
Per capita
revenues
Share of GDP Green spending General funds Revenue recycling
European Union Emissions Trading System,
Phase III
$4640 $9 0.03% 80% 20% 0%
California AB 32 Cap and Trade System $1034 $27 0.05% 45% 4% 55%
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (United
States)
$447 $8 0.01% 49% 32% 12%
Chinese Provincial Emission Trading Scheme
Pilots
$250 $2 0.02% 10% 90% 0%
Quebec Cap and Trade System for Emission
Allowances
$100 $13 0.03% 100% 0% 0%
Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program $92 $22 0.03% 90% 10% 0%
Switzerland Emission Trading System $9 $1 0.00% 0% 100% 0%
Combined globally: $6572 $8 0.02% 70% 21% 9%
Most revenue ﬁgures are for 2013 or FY 2013/14. Exceptions due to data availability are: Switzerland ETS (2014). Data sources for each system are cited in the text and include
author estimates where necessary. Shares may not add up to 100% as categories are not comprehensive and annual revenue budgeting may not match annual revenue
inﬂows.
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through the auction of emission permits was only added on years after
the initial pricing and trading systemwas in place. In other cases, such
as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the United States, revenue
production was integral from the beginning.8 In either case, it is no-
table that more auctioning means more government revenues–po-
tentially introducing government bias (Ciocirlan and Yandle, 2003)—
the use of which can either be designed into the policy from the be-
ginning or left to the political process.9 One potential upside of ex-
plicitly considering cap-and-trade revenues from the outset when
designing such systems is the ability for governments to engage the
public regarding beneﬁcial insights from the economic literature
around tax shifting, the potential for double dividends, or revenue
distribution–which may not otherwise enter the political dialogue in
the same way that they would for a carbon tax.
3.2. Carbon tax system revenues
Direct levies applied downstream to the emission of carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases or upstream to the sale of
carbon-intensive fuels raised about $21.7 billion in government
revenues globally in 2013, about three times that from cap and
trade systems. As they are generally labeled as straightforward
“taxes,” “fees,” or “levies” in name or public discourse, with exo-
genously-deﬁned pricing, the costs imposed and revenues gener-
ated by these instruments may be particularly publicly salient.108 The original RGGI Memorandum of Understanding (2005) and Model Rule
(2006) both included language not only on auction revenues, but also on the
general allocation of these revenues, for example, specifying that 25% of would be
used for “consumer beneﬁt or strategic purpose,” as decided by each state and
further outlining areas included therein.
9 See, for example, the lack of provision for revenues produced through Cali-
fornia’s Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, as recently described by the Cali-
fornia Legislative Analysts Ofﬁce (2016). The (ultimately failed) United States fed-
eral American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 h.R. 2454 (“Waxman-Markey
Bill”) also lacked provisions for revenue in its original draft, though Capitol Hill
negotiations subsequently ﬁlled that gap (see section 321, “Disposition of allow-
ances” in the ﬁnal passed revision) as the bill’s authors aimed to gather broader
support (New York Times, 2009). Meanwhile, President Obama’s contemporaneous
cap-and-trade proposal did in fact describe planned permit auctioning levels and
the revenue use, including directing two-thirds towards tax breaks (Ofﬁce of
Management and Budget, 2009).
10 Chetty, Looney, and Kroft (2009) helped apply the concept of consumer
salience (or, from Taylor and Thompson, 1982, “vividness”) to the impact of taxes on
purchasing decisions. For carbon taxes speciﬁcally, Rivers and Schaufele (2014)
argue that the British Columbia carbon tax’s impact on gasoline prices has been
more salient than an equivalent change in market prices, reﬂected in a seven-fold
larger than expected response in consumer demand in that province, supporting
earlier work on excise tax salience by Li et al. (2014). Similarly, O’Gorman and JotzoThis appears to relate to how the revenues are spent. For example,
whereas the most popular use of cap-and-trade revenues is on
“green” spending, this is actually the least popular use of carbon
tax revenues, representing just 15% of spending. Carbon tax rev-
enues are more often returned to taxpayers through other tax cuts
and rebates (44%) or are clearly tagged as being used to supple-
ment government general funds (28%). As depicted in the charts
that appear later, both the per capita revenues and carbon revenue
shares of GDP tend to be much higher for carbon taxes than for
cap-and-trade systems: 0.13% of GDP for taxes as opposed to just
0.02% for cap and trade systems.11
There are two principal insights gained from this: ﬁrst, system
design makes a difference in how revenue is spent, and secondly
system design is tied to how much is spent. Cap and trade may be
preferred by jurisdictions with less public support for pricing
(Baldwin, 2008; Harrison, 2012), and relatively small amounts of
revenue have been raised. Carbon taxes, however, have raised
more revenue, but generally do so in a more transparent way.
Though carbon taxes have a longer implementation history
than carbon cap-and-trade systems, they appeared to fall from
global favor in the mid to late 2000s as attention focused on the
potential ﬂexibility in distributional allocation of permits–and
therefore political feasibility in implemenation–of carbon cap-and-
trade systems.12 The return of carbon taxes since the late 2000s,
however, has often been explicitly justiﬁed as much by the ability
of the signiﬁcant revenues they create to offset existing labor taxes
(British Columbia) or help reduce recession-hit government deﬁ-
cits (Ireland, Iceland) as by their ability to mitigate carbon dioxide
emissions. Other jurisdictions have shown renewed interest in
carbon taxes due to their perceived simplicity and stability relative
to cap and trade systems (e.g., the United Kingdom’s Carbon Price
Floor, which functionally acts as a tax, was created to back up
volatile EU cap and trade permit prices).
It is worth noting, however, that evidence from the ﬁeld does
not universally support the argument for carbon tax simplicity:
whereas some systems, such as British Columbia’s, have been(footnote continued)
(2014) speculate that high elasticity of demand observed for electricity in Australia
in the two years following that system’s introduction was because of the long lead
times and number of news media mentions of the carbon tax over its roll-out.
11 Removing Australia’s (now canceled) data point reduces the ﬁgure for car-
bon taxes to 0.09%.
12 Sector-speciﬁc tradable exemptions could theoretically be used to make a
carbon tax just as ﬂexible as a cap-and-trade system. In practice, however, this does
not seem to have been implemented in any of the systems investigated here, while
the trade of permits that have been freely allocated under cap-and-trade systems is
common.
Table 2
Global carbon tax system revenues.
Carbon tax systems Annual revenue
(millions)
Per capita
revenues
Share of
GDP
Green spending General funds Revenue recycling
Australia carbon pricing mechanism (canceled) $8790 $391 0.60% 15% 1% 53%
Sweden carbon dioxide tax $3680 $381 0.67% 0% 50% 50%
Norway carbon dioxide tax $1580 $307 0.31% 30% 40% 30%
United Kingdom carbon price ﬂoor $1530 $24 0.05% 0% 85% 0%
British Columbia carbon tax shift $1100 $239 0.49% 0% 0% 102%
Denmark carbon dioxide tax act $1000 $177 0.29% 8% 47% 45%
Switzerland carbon dioxide levy $875 $107 0.13% 33% 0% 67%
Mexico special tax on production and services $870 $7 0.06% 0% 100% 0%
Finland carbon dioxide tax $800 $146 0.29% 0% 50% 50%
Ireland natural gas carbon tax, mineral oil tax, and
solid fuel carbon tax
$510 $111 0.03% 13% 88% 0%
Japan tax for climate change mitigation $490 $4 0.01% 100% 0% 0%
France domestic consumption tax on energy pro-
ducts (carbon dioxide)
$452 $7 0.02% 100% 0% 0%
Iceland carbon tax on carbon of fossil origin $30 $92 0.22% 0% 100% 0%
Combined globally: $21,707 $49 0.13% 15% 28% 44%
Most revenue ﬁgures are for 2013 or FY 2013/14. Exceptions due to data availability are: Denmark (2010), Mexico (2014), France (2014 partial year), Ireland (2012), and Japan
(2012). Data sources for each system are cited in the text and include author estimates where necessary. Shares may not add up to 100% as categories are not comprehensive
and annual revenue budgeting may not match annual revenue inﬂows.
13 Harrison (2010), invoking Kahneman et al. (1991), has argued that carbon
taxes may be inherently politically limited in the amount of costs they are able to
impose on end consumers, even with revenue recycling, given tendencies towards
loss aversion. While Australia’s case does not prove our speculation on the ex-
istence of a “revenue ceiling,” we nonetheless ﬁnd the observation useful in the
context of some international political commentary following repeal of the tax that
“It should serve as a stark warning… climate initiatives will cause American tax-
payers to suffer, as Australians had to learn the hard way,” (U.S. Republican ranking
member of the Senate Environment Committee James Inhofe, in ClimateWire,
2014), and rhetoric from the Prime Minister stressing the magnitude of the tax’s
economic impact (“Scrapping the carbon tax will save the average Australian
household $550 a year…. The carbon tax was a $9 billion a year hit on the Aus-
tralian economy.”) during its repeal (Abbot, 2014).
14 For example, new pricing systems in new jurisdictions have been considered
in Korea and South Africa. Looking forward, it is difﬁcult to forecast overall global
carbon revenues with accuracy given short-term adjustments in carbon revenue
policy parameters–for example, the European Union’s recent permit “backloading”
auction timing debate–that can signiﬁcantly affected year-to-year revenues. Year-
to-year emissions are relatively stable and predictable as functions of macro-
economic activity and relatively inelastic demands for energy, but the policies to
extract revenue from them have shown to be less so.
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others, such as the Scandinavian systems, have been subject to so
many fuel- and user-speciﬁc adjustments to the “carbon price”
over time as to be uncertain what the ﬁnal effect of the policy is. In
these cases, there is a confusion of seemingly interchangeable fuel
duties, carbon prices, and other value-added taxes such that the
actual carbon price–and its revenue stream–is subject to political
manipulation and seems to exist on paper only. It is unclear if this
phenomenon is an artifact of ﬁrst-generation northern European
carbon tax shifts or if it will affect newer version carbon taxes
elsewhere as well.
Adding to this complexity is the increasingly common situation
of overlapping carbon tax and carbon cap-and-trade systems, both
of which are generating public revenues and which may be di-
rected for separate purposes. In some European cases, including in
the United Kingdom and Norway, revenues from the regional cap-
and-trade system are more often directed toward green subsidies,
whereas a higher share of domestic carbon tax revenues go toward
general funds. Goulder and Schein (2013) have argued that carbon
pricing instrument choice inherently affects some (but not all)
system performance attributes–administrative simplicity as a key
differentiating advantage of carbon tax systems, for example,
versus cost-effectiveness in achieving a set emission cap target for
cap-and-trade. It therefore deserves further investigation whether
simultaneously administering both carbon pricing systems within
a single economy, as seems to be the practice in eight of the jur-
isdictions described here, affects real-world realization of such
attributes.
3.3. Time sensitivity of the data
Carbon pricing and revenue systems change over time, and the
data presented here are only recent snapshots–mostly for the year
2013 or FY2013/14.
Some changes are known or can be expected based upon ex-
isting law: both the European Union and California cap-and-trade
systems are set to rapidly increase their annual revenues in
coming years, independent of carbon price (a higher share of
auctioned permits in the European case and broader fuel coverage
in the California case). The Japanese and French carbon taxes are
set to do the same on account of predetermined tax-rate
escalation.
Changes can also be unexpected: the Australian carbon tax,which generated the most revenues of any system globally in
2013, was set to transition to a cap-and-trade system but was in-
stead abruptly canceled following a change in government, due in
no small part to the tax's unpopularity (Rootes, 2014). Revenues
per capita of this tax were among the highest in the world, sug-
gesting that there may be a political ceiling to the amount of
carbon tax revenue that can be raised, at least for taxes that do not
return a very high percentage of revenues to the taxpayer.13
Overall global carbon revenues therefore likely dropped in
2014, but may recover given the organic growth in existing pricing
systems or new systems coming on line.14
4. Discussion
Carbon taxes generate a range of revenues per capita, but to-
day’s cap-and-trade systems generate only moderate revenues per
capita. California’s AB 32, at $27 per capita (and on an increasing
revenue trend), is the highest of the cap-and-trade systems, while
nine of thirteen carbon tax systems exceed that level. This ob-
servation is supported by economic theory: whereas carbon taxes
and cap-and-trade systems both apply a price to all emissions,
cap-and-trade systems are often designed to obtain revenue lar-
gely from marginal emissions (with baseline emissions at least
partially grandfathered through free allocation of emission
Fig. 1. Global carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems: revenue used for “green spending” vs. revenue per capita. The diameter of each circle on the charts here and below
corresponds to the total revenue of each system to give a sense of overall scale—larger circles correspond to larger total system revenues. Cap-and-trade systems are
presented in grey; carbon tax systems are presented in black.
15 Exceptions being Japan’s small revenue per capita carbon tax, France’s nas-
cent carbon tax, and the Chinese provincial or municipal cap-and-trade system
pilots.
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tioning of emission permits, its revenue stream would look more
similar to a straight tax (and per capita revenues for any given
system would likely increase). Of the cap-and-trade systems de-
scribed here, only the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the
United States implements near-full auctioning (but at a low ﬂoor
price). Low cap-and-trade revenues may be a political feasibility
feature since something that is not labeled a tax and does not
notably dent consumers’ wallets may be implemented with less
notice (Rabe and Borick, 2012).
While there is broad variability among the per capita burden of
the carbon-revenue systems overall, Australia’s now-canceled
carbon tax stands out as having both the world’s largest overall
pool of revenues ($8.8 billion) and the largest per capita burden
($391 annually), more even than the Scandinavian countries
where carbon taxes have a long history. The Australian per capita
revenue level exceeded British Columbia’s system by nearly two-
thirds, and that system was gradually introduced with a pre-
determined ﬁve-year tax rate ramp-up so as to avoid economic, or
political, disruption (See Appendix B for more detail on these two
carbon tax systems, both of which were ostensibly set to transition
to cap-and-trade systems after an introductory period—neither
occurred). This observation may be striking to those who other-
wise saw Australia’s carbon tax, with its $30 per metric ton
carbon dioxide price, as being roughly in line with other global
carbon pricing systems. In fact, this medium to high per ton price
—coupled with the country’s high (coal-ﬁred) greenhouse gas
emission intensity, an overnight launch, and the fact that simple
carbon taxes generate revenues from the full range of priced
emissions—meant that Australia's system would result in a larger
economic shock than other global carbon-revenue systems, by
design. Repealing the tax was thus a major element of the oppo-
sition's campaign platform—a similar tack that was tried, but did
not work in British Columbia (Jaccard, 2012) where the tax was
revenue-neutral and introduced more gradually.
The following ﬁgures compare the annual revenues per capita
from existing global carbon-pricing systems with the share of their
revenues, as used for various purposes, in order to identify and
elucidate common trends (Figs. 1–6).4.1. Green spending
There is a strong split between carbon taxes and cap-and-trade
systems on the use of revenues to subsidize energy efﬁciency,
renewable energy, or other climate-change mitigation- and
adaptation-related activities. We estimate that 47% of all cap-and-
trade revenues are spent on such green subsidies, compared to
only 15% of carbon tax revenues. Moreover, among the more
substantial global examples, the cap-and-trade system that spends
the smallest share of its revenues on green subsidies (California at
45%) exceeds the share from the carbon tax that spends the
highest percentage of its revenues on green subsidies (Switzerland
at 33%).15
Interestingly, there is no system, tax or cap-and-trade, in the
upper-right quadrant of this distribution: both high per capita
revenues and a high share of revenues spent on green subsidies.
This supports the hypothesis that such revenues can only be so
narrowly earmarked when the individual impact (and not the
absolute scale—see the European Union, for example) is small and
relatively unnoticeable.
4.2. Carbon revenues in general funds
The use of carbon revenues to supplement government general
funds, without earmarks, has been a relatively unpopular choice
for governments enacting carbon revenue systems. Only ﬁve of
twenty systems direct more than half of their revenues to this
purpose. Of those ﬁve systems, four are relatively recently enacted
carbon taxes with low to mid per capita burdens. Both of the
poorer countries with carbon revenue systems are also within this
group, as are the two systems explicitly set up during the after-
math of the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis to reduce spiraling gov-
ernment deﬁcits (Iceland and Ireland).
The Scandinavian country carbon taxes comprise a special
cluster: In practice their revenues are largely directed to general
Fig. 2. Global carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems: revenue used for general funds vs. revenue per capita.
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environmental taxes (including energy, carbon dioxide, and other
pollutants) have been consciously introduced or increased along-
side reductions in existing labor taxes, which we regard as a form
of partial revenue recycling.
Apart from the Chinese provincial pilots, the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative in the United States—another subnational cap
and trade system—has the largest share of revenues going toward
general funds (32%) of the cap-and-trade systems. Almost all cap-
and-trade systems have some share of funding going toward
general funds, however, if only to cover public program adminis-
tration costs ranging between 3% and 6%.
4.3. Revenue recycling
The direct return of carbon-pricing revenues to businesses or
individuals through tax breaks or rebates is used by some carbonFig. 3. Global carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems: revetax systems but uncommon among cap-and-trade systems.
Only two of seven global cap-and-trade systems (9% of reven-
ues) directly return any revenues. California’s AB 32 is an extreme
value, returning just over half of its auction revenues, largely
though ﬂat rebate checks to households. Even this revenue system,
however, is open to interpretation: The “returned” revenues in
California’s case are never actually possessed by the state but ra-
ther its regulated monopoly independent electric power utilities,
to whom the permits are consigned (for free) before auction and
then returned to household customers largely through a ﬂat rebate
on utility bills. The share of California’s carbon revenues that are
recycled is also set to decline, to about 30% from 2015 onwards,
following the expanding sectoral scope of non-revenue-recycled
permit auctions (see Appendix A for more detail on the consign-
ment feature). After California, the next highest cap and trade
program share to be recycled is the Regional Greenhouse Gas In-
itiative (at 12%, mostly through electric utility rate relief), thenue directly recycled/returned vs. revenue per capita.
17 British Columbia also used this approach in a one-off case when ﬁrst in-
troducing its carbon tax policy in order to improve political viability, though it
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Carbon tax revenue recycling is not universal either, with only a
slim majority of systems (seven of thirteen, 44% of total revenues)
returning revenues. Tax systems that return revenues tend to have
larger par capita burdens (greater than $100) and include all the
Scandinavian systems, reﬂecting their longstanding and explicit
labor-environment tax shift strategy. British Columbia’s revenue-
neutral carbon tax is an extreme value globally, with over 100% of
revenues recycled through corporate and individual tax breaks as
well as low-income rebate checks. Switzerland’s carbon tax is also
notable for returning two-thirds of its revenues to residents and
businesses through ﬂat checks mailed to all individuals and busi-
ness payroll tax rebates. Before its cancellation, Australia operated
by far the world’s largest revenue recycling program, returning
over $4 billion annually to households through various individual
tax cuts or subgroup targeted rebates (but, unlike British Co-
lumbia, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, little to no
broad-based recycling to business through tax shifts). No other
carbon pricing system recycles more than half of its revenues.
We observe ﬁve principal ways that today’s carbon revenues
are returned to the economy, with many systems using more than
one form of recycling. Each form has different distributional and
political economy implications and is justiﬁed on different
grounds:
4.3.1. Corporate tax cuts, either on proﬁts or payroll taxes, granted to
businesses (used by seven systems
Australia, Sweden, Norway, British Columbia, Denmark, Swit-
zerland’s carbon tax, and Finland). This is the most popular form of
recycling, and most carbon revenue systems that do recycle use it.
It also tends to be favored by economists as the most efﬁcient way
to burnish economic growth when combined with a carbon tax
shift (Carbone et al., 2013; Goulder and Hafstead, 2013; McKibben
et al., 2012). With energy-consuming businesses otherwise being
both heavily impacted by, and politically organized to oppose,
carbon-pricing policies (Olson, 1965; Svendsen et al., 2001), it is
unsurprising that carbon revenues are used to improve competi-
tiveness by cutting the cost of doing business in other areas. Such
carbon “tax shifts” are often described in terms of taxing “bads”
(i.e., carbon dioxide pollution) instead of taxing “goods” (i.e., hiring
or proﬁt-making). One criticism of this approach from ﬁscal con-
servatives is that corporate income taxation that occurs only to
raise government revenue–already recognized as being an in-
efﬁcient form of taxation (Gentry, 2007; Goolsbee, 1998; OECD,
2008)—should in principle be reduced to its lowest possible level
independent of any carbon pricing system.16
From a distributional perspective, it has also been argued that
reducing taxes on businesses creates disproportionate beneﬁt for
the wealthier parts of society who are more likely to own stocks or
receive corporate dividends (a political issue that surfaced in the
case of British Columbia, for example; see Lee and Sanger, 2008).
This argument is muted, however, when considering the use of
small business- and minimum-wage-targeted or other corporate
payroll tax cuts, both of which have the potential to increase
employment (Kramarz and Philippon, 2001; Chéron et al., 2008),
with broad social and political beneﬁt. One ﬁnal consideration is
the distribution of such tax beneﬁts among not individuals but
various business sectors. Whereas six of the seven countries listed
above cut tax rates across a broad swath of businesses, Australia
cuts only a minor small business tax with limited applicability. Its
revenue policy conspicuously did not address the increased cost of
doing business felt by general energy-consuming businesses by16 See Marron and Toder (2013) for perspectives on corporate tax reform
through new carbon taxes in the United States.using revenues to counteract that.
4.3.2. Income-tax cuts granted to individuals (used by ﬁve systems:
Australia, Sweden, British Columbia, Denmark, and Finland)
The analogue to business tax cuts, broad-based individual tax
cuts are the second most common form of revenue recycling and,
where used, are often of a similar revenue magnitude to the for-
mer. Some systems choose to reduce existing income-tax rates
within a bracket and/or increase the tax-free income exemption.
Both approaches have low administrative burdens and beneﬁt a
broad part of the population that faces marginally increased living
costs as a result of carbon pricing and that otherwise carries much
of the government revenue burden. From a distributional per-
spective, income-tax reductions used today tend to be progressive
in that rate cuts are focused on lower income tiers. One criticism of
this form of recycling, evident in a number of the Scandinavian
“labor for carbon” tax shifts, is that it is hard to directly and visibly
tie income-tax reductions to carbon-pricing revenues over time
and layered on to other changes in the tax code. In the United
States, this has been a particular objection of conservative com-
mentators to the basic concept of revenue-neutrality (Murphy,
2012) as it blurs the line between carbon-revenue recycling and
the use of carbon revenues for government general funds. British
Columbia, and, before its cancellation, Australia, both use this form
of recycling but address the salience issue head-on by publishing
simple balance tables accounting for how new carbon revenues in
each year would offset expected ﬁscal losses from new income tax
cuts (see details in Appendix B).
4.3.3. Broad-based ﬂat rebates granted to individuals or households
(used by three systems: California, Australia, and Switzerland)
Carbon stimulus-type “checks in the mail” have been advocated
for, drawing from across the political spectrum, as a viscerally
appealing way to disburse new carbon revenues in a straightfor-
ward and universally visible format (Shultz and Becker, 2013;
Hansen, 2015).
The two clearest examples of this today are in California and
Switzerland.17 One argument in favor of ﬂat rebates from a ﬁscal
balance perspective is that revenues used to fund annual “carbon
dividends” would be politically difﬁcult to appropriate for other
public spending at a later date under a different political en-
vironment. (See the example of the Alaska Permanent Fund Divi-
dend in the United States, which has sent checks in the mail to
state residents from oil production royalties without interruption
for thirty-two years and weathered numerous political attempts at
appropriation.) Relevant evidence from the few examples of car-
bon pricing in the ﬁeld today does not refute this thesis, but ex-
perience remains limited.
From a distributional perspective, one criticism of the ﬂat di-
vidend approach is that it does not compensate different in-
dividuals fairly for the costs incurred through carbon pricing.
There are many reasons that some classes may be intrinsically
more impacted by carbon pricing than others (or, to borrow lan-
guage normally used to describe ﬁrm behavior under carbon pri-
cing, individual marginal abatement costs may vary).18 For ex-
ample, short-term switching costs may be particularly high be-
cause of starting conditions: including living in less-dense areas
with long commutes, older inefﬁcient homes, or more carbon-in-
tensive regional electric power grids. Some individuals may alsoactually used existing surplus revenues from another source in order to do so.
18 Looking beyond consumer costs, workers in carbon-intensive industries
could also be expected to face categorically higher costs from carbon pricing due to
job losses.
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ability of public transportation infrastructure, harsher climates, or
larger families. Any given level of energy consumption may re-
present a larger portion of household budgets for those with lower
incomes, making new costs incurred by carbon pricing more
signiﬁcant.19 All these classes would receive the same dividend as
those with lower existing carbon footprints, better low-carbon
adjustment options, or who otherwise might be shielded from the
costs of carbon pricing through subsidized energy pricing
regimes.20 This begs the question that carbon revenue dividends
can be thought of as a form of individual compensation to offset
speciﬁcally incurred carbon-pricing costs–rather they are more a
general tool for population-wide macroeconomic stimulus to off-
set the overall economic drag of pricing emissions.21 The dis-
tributional fairness issue could potentially be addressed by ap-
plying tiers to refunds by geography, by income, or by existing
baseline energy spending — though these approaches might in-
duce their own set of substantive and political problems, including
the potential to mute the carbon price signal for a particular im-
pacted class if not designed correctly. In practice, we are not aware
of signiﬁcant public or political dissatisfaction with existing ﬂat
carbon-revenue-recycling systems.
4.3.4. Energy price adjustments (used by three systems: California,
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and Sweden)
Some systems return carbon revenues by reducing electricity
rates, existing fuel taxes, or otherwise granting on-bill rebates tied
to volumetric energy consumption. This approach can closely
compensate end-users for the increased energy costs faced under
a carbon-pricing system, but can be criticized on economic
grounds for dampening the effective carbon price signal, which is
generally the policy’s original intent. For the two United States
regional systems that have adopted this approach, it is only used
for a small share of overall carbon revenue—about 5–15%—and
appears to be more of a stopgap measure justiﬁed by regulatory or
political expediency in reaction to after-the-fact concerns around
policy costs.
California, for example, included a concrete phase-out timeline
for its small business electric power on-bill subsidy and justiﬁed
the rate-reduction approach largely on grounds of minimizing
price shock (CPUC, 2013). In the Swedish case (as in the case of the
Netherlands and Slovenia, discussed in Appendix B), carbon rev-
enues are not explicitly used to reduce energy prices, but they are
used to stand in for existing fuel excise taxes such that in some
cases carbon taxes have been raised without actually affecting the
ﬁnal fuel price seen by end users.2219 Numerous scholars have attempted to model distributional impacts of car-
bon taxes in, for example, the United States. Considering both geographic and in-
come distributional impacts, Burtraw et al. (2009) observe that carbon footprint
variables differ across areas, especially among lower-income households, but that
summed tax impacts varied less for upper-income households. Meanwhile, Hassett
et al. (2007) argue that distributional incidence of a carbon tax is less varied when
considered over an individual’s lifetime.
20 This could lead to petitions for class exemption or overall policy opposition
among motivated groups. See, for example, critiques by United States governors of
states with coal-intensive electric grids or poor renewable energy resources on
compliance with the proposed EPA 111(d) Clean Power Plan (Sean et al. 2014),
which aims to limit power sector greenhouse gas emissions.
21 This is not a problem in Alaska because that program is not a consumption
tax.
22 Here, Sweden appears to be pursuing an accounting concept of taxing en-
ergy based upon the marginal externality damages associated with its use (in this
case, global carbon emissions) rather than an arbitrary volumetric energy excise tax
justiﬁed primarily by the government revenue it generates, or which is otherwise
intended as a proxy for energy consumption-related pollution (See Oates, 1995, and
Hahn, 1989, for early framing discussions of how governments during this period
did or did not follow economists’ recommendations in setting environmental
taxes).4.3.5. Rebates granted speciﬁcally to low-income or other particu-
larly “impacted” households (used by two systems — Australia, British
Columbia)
Just two carbon pricing systems globally return some share of
revenues directly to poor households or (in the case of British
Columbia) to rural households with higher intrinsic or otherwise
specially inelastic energy demand (as outlined in Section 4.3.3
above).23 This use of revenues for poorer consumers in particular
(including ﬁxed-income elderly) is generally justiﬁed by the ar-
gument that they spend a larger share of their income on energy
as opposed to other discretionary spending, and so are particularly
impacted by the marginal costs of carbon pricing (Dinan, 2012). An
extension of this argument is that poor consumers have less ability
to afford the higher costs of all goods and services indirectly
brought about by pricing carbon throughout the economy. At the
same time, however, poorer consumers also tend to spend less
money on energy or even other goods and services in an absolute
sense than wealthier consumers, so their total carbon-pricing
policy costs are less in the aggregate than other income groups.
Though there does not appear to be signiﬁcant political con-
troversy over this form of segregated revenue recycling where it is
in use today, another option to address this issue for jurisdictions
that grant ﬂat individual rebates would be to instead calibrating
the dollar amount of that rebate such that the poorest consumers
will be fully or near-fully compensated for increased carbon policy
costs through that mechanism alone.
4.4. Non-earmarked versus niche use of revenues
The above chart combines the shares of revenues used in either
general funds or recycled into the economy—that is, revenues not
earmarked to subsidize the expansion of public spending on some
narrow cause. The results are striking: no global system with a
burden larger than $22 per capita uses less than half of its rev-
enues in this way. Even that system—Alberta’s—applies only to
large oil sand producers and so has little effect on the province’s
general population. The next-highest system is the European Un-
ion emission trading system, with an annual burden of just $9 per
capita. Globally, systems with larger per capita impact tend to use
revenues in non-earmarked ways. Some of the smaller systems,
particularly carbon taxes, start that way from the beginning.
This observation should be seen within the existing literature
on public support for environmental pricing, given different rev-
enue uses, which is mixed. Thalmann (2004), for example, dis-
cerned little different in Swiss voters’ fossil energy tax support
given different revenue uses. Hsu et al. (2008), showed that the
non-niche use of revenues to reduce other existing taxes reduced
opposition to gasoline taxes in Canada, supporting earlier survey
work by Krupnick et al. (2001) in California. Meanwhile, Sælen and
Kallbekken (2011), found that Norwegian voters tended on the
whole to view fuel taxes unfavorably but increased their support
when revenues are earmarked for green spending, similar to an
earlier ﬁnding on Dutch transport taxes by Schuitema and Steg
(2008) whereby consumers preferred revues be spent on issues
with a topical nexus to the sector being taxed.
Given this, an explanatory hypothesis that people and busi-
nesses may not support burdensome carbon prices if the revenues
are not used in a ﬁscally conservative way does not contradict the
existing literature. That is, as the environmental pricing mechan-
ism increases in strength to affect a higher share of household
income, and is observable across many different consumption
sectors (as a carbon tax does, but an urban trafﬁc congestion fee23 California by law directs a signiﬁcant share of its “green spending” to low-
income households but does not do so through rebates or targeted tax cuts.
Fig. 4. Global carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems: revenue recycled or used in general funds (combined) vs. revenue per capita.
26 Nordhaus (2007) recounts the volatility observed in global cap-and-trade
permit prices; public revenues derived from auction of such permits could be ex-
pected to be at least as volatile as the underlying permit prices, unless expressly
accounted for through a ﬂexible auctioning mechanism.
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consumers’ minds as a broad ﬁscal instrument rather than a tar-
geted environmental fee, with political viability on account of
revenue uses more closely aligned with existing government ﬁscal
priorities.24 Such attitudes may have played into the demise of the
Australian carbon tax, which lies somewhat outside of this trend
line with a large $391 per capita burden, but only a modest 54% of
revenues used to offset existing taxes or directly rebated to con-
sumers. This meant that a per capita revenue burden of $180 an-
nually—larger than all but three other global carbon-revenue
systems in total—was directed toward niche public spending
areas, many of them new government expenditures (see Appendix
B for details). This level was twice that of second-highest system
Norway (per capita niche spending of $92) and over ﬁve times that
of third-highest system Switzerland ($35). To put this in context,
Australia was spending twenty times the European Union cap-
and-trade system's annual per capita total carbon revenue burden
on niche areas alone.
4.4.1. Carbon-revenue system form and revenue volatility
A general framework in the carbon-pricing literature is that
pure carbon taxes offer “price certainty” while pure cap-and-trade
systems offer emission “quantity certainty.” (Weitzman, 1974; Pi-
zer, 2002)25 One extension of this argument is that carbon tax
price certainty also results in carbon “revenue certainty” to ad-
ministering governments, given the relative stability of economy-
wide emission levels year-to-year. The effect of volatility can be
seen in practice: whereas the Provincial Ministry of Finance fore-
casts year-ahead government revenues from the British Columbia
carbon tax within a margin of error less than 5% (allowing them to
precisely budget for the use of those revenues), the California
government by contrast appropriates much of its own carbon
spending after quarterly auctions have already been held and24 This would resonate with a concurrent Kallbekken and Sælen (2011) ﬁnding
that public support for environmental taxes increased monotonically with pubic
trust in the government’s use of tax revenues, deﬁned in a questionnaire as “The
government makes reasonable use of income [revenue] from taxes and fees.”
25 Recent scholarship has questioned this theoretical framework’s (Wara, 2014)
applicability to policymaking, pointing out that as a matter of practical politics, cap-
and-trade (even if not designed as a hybrid system) has an implicit ceiling price
beyond which the cap would be disregarded or modiﬁed as politically unviable.revenues deposited into a separate holding fund. The price vola-
tility inherent in cap-and-trade revenue streams26 may explain
why it is uncommon for them to be relied upon for general fund
use or revenue recycling. This suggests that it would be challen-
ging to make a new cap-and-trade system (at a high carbon price)
a signiﬁcant part of a jurisdiction’s overall tax system reform.
4.5. Political ideology
This chart shows the generalized political ideology of a jur-
isdiction's government (majority party and executive) in power at
the time of ﬁrst revenues from each new carbon-pricing system.27
While the carbon-pricing issue is a highly politically partisan one
in the United States, these results suggest that it is less so else-
where, with several right-leaning jurisdictions having im-
plemented carbon-pricing schemes.28 The relationship between
ideology and carbon system form or revenue use is mixed. Apart
from Alberta’s oil sands-targeted system, all right-leaning or cen-
ter governments use carbon taxes rather than cap and trade, while
left-leaning governments used both forms. Furthermore, regarding
revenue use (again excepting Alberta29), all right-leaning or center
governments directed at least two-thirds of carbon revenues to be
recycled to the public or otherwise used in non-earmarked general
funds. Left-leaning governments were mixed in their revenue use.
4.6. Timing of carbon revenue system introduction
The ﬁrst Scandinavian environment-for-labor tax shift carbon-27 National ideological coding is from World Bank’s Database of Political In-
stitutions (2012), supplemented by the authors’ judgment where data is unavail-
able. System names marked with an asterisk (*) indicate that a single ruling party
held a clear majority of the legislative voting share. In the case of Finland, coded as
right leaning, the executive’s party afﬁliation (right) did not match that of the
majority legislative party (left, but with only a slight voting share margin over the
opposition). Chinese pilots are excluded.
28 Notably, however, all such systems had modest revenues at outset.
29 See Appendix A for a discussion of whether Alberta’s carbon pricing regime
should be considered functionally as a cap-and-trade or a carbon tax system.
Fig. 5. Global carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems: revenue recycled or used in general funds (combined) vs. political ideology.
Fig. 6. Global carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems: revenue recycled or used in general funds vs. year of ﬁrst system revenue.
31 This dynamic has been cited by those opposed to using carbon pricing to
offset existing government revenue streams in the United States (Cass, 2015). It is
worth noting, however that most proposed United States federal carbon tax
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mained the only revenue-producing global carbon pricing systems
for ﬁfteen years.30 Then, in just the eight years from 2007 to 2014,
seventeen carbon-revenue systems (including New Zealand’s sys-
tem, now not revenue producing—see Appendix A) were launched
with a variety of per capita revenue burdens, uses of revenue, and
forms (including, for the ﬁrst time, cap-and-trade systems). This
most recent cohort of carbon-revenue systems appears to lack any
temporal trends in regard to these variables.
In theory, if marginal costs are sufﬁciently high compared to
marginal beneﬁts of emissions, pricing carbon should reduce the
level of emissions from business as usual, which, all else equal,30 Exempting the Slovenian and Costa Rican so-called “carbon taxes,” see Ap-
pendix B, and Phase II of the European Union Emission Trading System, in which
only a token amount of emission permits were auctioned.should produce carbon-revenue streams that gradually decline
over the long term. (This would provide an additional challenge
for those hoping to use such revenues as a substantial portion of
government funding.31) In practice, however, many carbon-rev-
enue systems have actually increased their revenues over time
through expanding the scope of their coverage on the economy
(e.g., California, Scandinavian countries), increasing the share ofschemes, for example, would nonetheless aim to increase revenues through at least
the medium term by establishing built-in escalation of the tax rate that exceeded
the rate of emission drawdown (Williams and Wichman, 2015). See Chesnaye and
Weyant (2006) for a collection projections under the Energy Modeling Forum of
global emission trajectories under carbon pricing scenarios.
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market to increase the value of cap-and-trade emission permits
(European Union, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative), or in-
creasing the rate of a carbon tax (British Columbia, Switzerland,
Japan, France, UK, Scandinavian countries—see Appendix A and B
descriptions for more details). In cases where revenues have de-
clined, they actually tend to go to rapidly to zero through policy
cancellation or operational hiccups (e.g., Australia, New Zealand),
though Denmark did undergo a temporary decline in carbon tax
revenues due to a lowering of the rate in the early 2000s, since
reversed.32 See Shultz and Bingaman (2014) for a discussion of the variety of greenhouse
gas emission mitigation policies commonly in use at the state level, for example.
33 The possibility of enacting a carbon tax as part of a “grand bargain” com-
prehensive tax reform package was ﬂoated as a “non-traditional revenue source” by
Senate Finance Chairman Max Baucus (D) in June 2013 (The Hill, 2013). Two
months later, Myron Ebell of the conservative Competitive Enterprise Institute said
of a carbon tax, “The danger is that it could be included in a big budget or tax
reform deal. Such deals are negotiated in secret…. I think the fact that it is the only
thing on the table that would raise a lot of revenue means that it will be a threat for
the foreseeable future.” Ebell does not support a carbon tax. (Capital Research
Center, 2013)
34 Metcalf and Weisbach (2009) describe mechanisms that a legislature or
regulator might employ to guard against ad hoc petitions while preserving some
ﬂexibility to update rates given new information, including delegation to expert
intermediaries.
35 In this sense, maximizing the visibility of revenue use could potentially
improve overall policy credibility, an important factor in motivating emission mi-
tigation investments (Montgomery and Smith, 2007). Ackerman and Stewart (1985)
made a similar observation on the importance of a revenue stream from the
market-based pollution controls in giving the regulator an incentive to preserve the
enforcement and credibility of the policy.5. Conclusion and policy implications
Cap-and-trade systems collect $6.57 billion in government
revenues globally, 70% of that designated for “green spending”.
Carbon taxes collected $21.7 billion, 72% of that for use in general
funds or returned to general public. One clear takeaway from our
look at carbon revenue systems is that cap-and-trade systems tend
to earmark more of their revenues on environmental or other
spending. While causation or covariance in this relationship is
uncertain, we can hypothesize a few plausible causal pathways
and potential implications for jurisdictions such as the United
States that might consider enacting such systems.
We do know that in some cases (e.g., Ireland and Iceland),
governments that were ﬁscally stressed started carbon taxes
speciﬁcally for the general fund revenues they would create. We
also know of cases (e.g., British Columbia, Scandinavian coun-
tries) in which cutting existing taxes was a major stated upfront
goal of establishing a carbon tax. There does not, however, appear
to be any clear analogue in which a government launched a cap-
and-trade system primarily for the revenues generated or to cut
other existing taxes. So, for jurisdictions that already want to
recycle or otherwise use carbon revenues for existing ﬁscal
needs, a more straightforward carbon tax seems to be the pre-
ferred policy tool.
We also have cases, however, where carbon taxes were the
chosen pricing instrument, but upfront revenue intentions were
unclear or not a part of the political justiﬁcation for the overall
policy. Results range from using all revenues for general funds
(e.g., United Kingdom, Mexico), to recycling a portion of revenues
(e.g., Switzerland), to earmarking all revenues on green spending
(e.g., Japan, France). So, choosing a carbon tax in absence of a clear
revenue policy has not guaranteed a particular outcome.
It is also important to observe that most cap-and-trade systems
freely allocate some share of their emission permits. So, at a given
per ton carbon dioxide price, cap-and-trade systems are on aver-
age generating less public revenue than an equivalent carbon tax
would. The higher ﬁscal stakes of a carbon tax may make the
choices around how to use its revenues more politically salient. Of
the carbon taxes, the ones with the softest political messaging on
revenue use are also the smallest in revenue per capita terms. Of
these, Japan and France (and potentially the United Kingdom) are
set to grow their revenues quickly as carbon tax rates rise (see
Appendix B for details). It remains to be seen if these jurisdictions
will revisit carbon-revenue uses or else postpone signiﬁcant rate
increases.
Finally, we can draw from the global experiences outlined
above to offer a few observations on a prospective new national or
regional carbon-revenue system in the United States, and the po-
tential advantages or novel characteristics it might present com-
pared other emission mitigation policy options or even a “revenue-
weak” carbon pricing system. First is simply to recognize that there
are a number of other policy options that United States jurisdic-
tions already have at their disposal and use to address greenhousegas emissions: mandates (e.g. renewables portfolio standards,
building codes), technology performance standards (e.g. vehicle
fuel economy standards), and subsidies (e.g. production tax cred-
its, net energy metering, ﬁnancial mechanisms, R&D) for
example.32 But carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems with auc-
tioning are categorically different in that they are not only emis-
sion mitigation instruments but also compromise the relatively
few potentially politically palatable new avenues for public-rev-
enue generation (or ways to pay for desired tax cuts elsewhere).33
Second is that focusing on carbon revenues could improve overall
policy lock-in and longevity. The “front end” of a non-revenue-
producing carbon-pricing system—or command-and-control en-
vironmental policies—could face pressure to be (potentially non-
transparently) modiﬁed over time so as to adjust headline per-ton
pricing rates and exempt or grandfather certain politically inﬂu-
ential parties, degrading the overall pricing policy.34 But if system
revenues are tied to visible budgetary ends, then any politically
expeditious changes on the front end would have to be grounded
in the reality of preserving the back-end revenue stream.35 Lastly,
from a policy efﬁcacy standpoint, it must be acknowledged that
though the intended marginal impact of any domestic emission
mitigation policy—carbon-pricing or otherwise—would be to slow
or avert climate change, that end result itself cannot be relied
upon to gauge policy success. Observable geophysical climate dy-
namics are subject to intertemporal variation, planetary feedbacks,
and the emission levels of other countries; even domestic emis-
sion trends themselves would be inﬂuenced by a number of other
economic factors and government regulations apart from carbon-
pricing. Absolute, locally-experienced global climate phenomena
may not offer sufﬁcient policy support over time. Carbon revenues,
on the other hand, are more dependable symbols of a mitigation
policy’s efﬁcacy: publicly visible, reportable year-to-year, and po-
litically immediate.
New global carbon-revenue streams are launching at a rate of
about one every six months. Though total revenues remain rela-
tively modest, they are still at tens of billions of dollars annually
and growing. The variation across a multitude of young systems, in
both approach and outcome, suggests a lack of strong public or
political norms to guide policymakers and constituents through
the lawmaking process. Moreover, understanding how these new
revenue models relate to conventional income, employment, cor-
porate, or sales taxes is not trivial. Carbon pricing and its revenues
are not fully in the realm of tax specialists, not are they the pro-
vince of energy and climate experts. Through development of this
carbon revenue dataset–and its ongoing improvement and main-
tenance—we hope to have shown that there now exists enough
global experience to begin useful comparative analysis among
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A.1 European Union Emissions Trading System, Phase IIIctive period 2013–2020
overage Coverage varies across twenty-eight member states but generally includes the electric power sector, energy-intensive
industrial sectors, and aviation. This totals about 45 percent of economy-wide greenhouse house emissions under a
single, European Union-wide emissions cap.evenue
streamTotal auction revenues for 2013 were $4.64b (EUR 3.63b)b at an average permit price of EUR 4.38 ($5.60). In 2013,
about 40 percent of total emission permits were auctioned, up from only about 4 percent in the second phase of the
system, which ended in 2012.c In most member states, the electric power sector must now buy all permits at auction,
but some countries do get power sector “transition assistance” budgets. Industrial sectors received 80 percent free al-
location in 2013, decreasing to 30 percent free allocation in 2020. Aviation receives 85 percent free allocation through
2020.
Auctions for the majority of member states are conducted through the common European Energy Exchange (EEX)
platform and are returned to individual member states according to their share of total emissions, with 12 percent of
total revenues held back to redistribute to poorer EU economies. Germany, Poland, and the United Kingdom hold se-
parate auctions and have separate revenue streams.
Top revenue streams in 2013 included Germany ($1.01b, EUR 790m), the United Kingdom ($619m, EUR 485m), Italy
($493m, EUR 386m), Spain ($441m, EUR 346m), Poland ($312m, EUR 244m), and France ($279m, EUR 219m).
Total expected revenues for third phase through 2020 at the EUR 10.25 ($13.09 at nominal y2013 exchange rates)
“reference price” would reach about $108b (EUR 85b, though this reference price is about twice the current market price
for emission permits and so likely overstates future revenues).se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 70–87 percent.- Following debate in the European Parliament environmental committee on use of auction revenues—including po-
tential requirements around non-EU developing country expenditures—use of revenues were ultimately left to in-
dividual member states by the European Commission in 2008 with the nonbinding recommendation that at least half of
revenues be used for “climate- and energy-related purposes.” Under the Monitoring Mechanism Regulation of May 2013,
member states were, however, required to begin reporting annual auction revenue spending. According to the European
Commission,d most countries exceeded the 50 percent “green” spending requirement in 2013 and this area actually
represented about $4b (EUR 3b), or 87 percent of total spending.
In Germany, for example, almost all auction revenue funds ﬂow into a “Special Energy and Climate Fund,” which are
supplemented by a separate reserve fund and the German government-owned development bank KfW. Most of the
expenditures of this fund were directed toward “green” measures, and reported FY2013 spending of about $332m (EUR
260m) on building energy efﬁciency retroﬁts, $543m (EUR 425m) on transportation electriﬁcation, $230m (EUR 180m)
on renewable energy, $166m (EUR 130m) on additional energy efﬁciency projects, and $140m (EUR 110m) on “climate
action programs.”
Elsewhere in Europe, Spain, France, Romania, Portugal, Lithuania, and others reported spending up to 100 percent of
auction revenues on similar domestic “climate and energy related”measures. Spain spent almost all of its funds—$398m
(EUR 312m)—speciﬁcally on renewable energy, while France dedicated 100 percent of its spending toward nontransport
energy efﬁciency.
Other earmarks: 14–20 percent.
- Like a few other European Union states, Germany spent a portion of its auction revenues—$358m (EUR 280m) in 2013,
or about a third of its total—on international climate ﬁnancing. Finland similarly spent about half of its auction revenues
on international climate ﬁnancing and development assistance. International developing country expenditures totaled
about 14 percent of total EU revenue expenditures.
Meanwhile, there are ongoing debates in other member states around revenue expenditures, with some, including
Romania, Czech Republic, and Hungary, proposing spending about half on “green”measures going forward and the other
half on other purposes. Greece is generally reported to direct most of its revenues toward renewable energy develop-
ment, though in 2014 it notiﬁed the European Commission of its intention to instead spend a sliding portion of its
auction revenues—not to exceed 20 percent—on compensation for energy-intensive industries.eGeneral funds: 8–22 percent.
- Austria, Netherlands, Ireland, and Denmark do not earmark auction revenues for speciﬁc purposes and so these can be
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many reported spending $22m (EUR 17 m) on emission trading system management costs. The United Kingdom is also
generally regarded as keeping cap-and-trade auction revenues completely un-earmarked, though some observers in-
terpret increased public spending on various green measures as being indirectly funded by this additional revenue
stream.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- It is unknown if any EU member state reports explicitly returning emission trading system auction revenues to its
taxpayers.a This appendix outlines author estimates of revenues from global carbon cap-and-trade systems (in most cases as of 2013), as well as
their uses. Please see the World Bank, 2014 annual “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing” report for updated details on other cap-and-trade
system design elements. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/25053834/state-trends-carbon-pricing-2015
b European Commission, “Climate Action: Auctioning,” http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/cap/auctioning/index_en.htm. This is the
European Commission’s stated auction revenue, which is similar but not equal to author calculations from EC auction data of EUR 3.204
billion.
c Uneven phase I and phase II auctioning did nonetheless produce signiﬁcant revenues of over EUR 5 billion from 2005 to 2012, mostly
concentrated in a few member states, including Germany, where it was fully spent on green activities, and Norway and the United
Kingdom, where it was fully transferred to government general funds without earmark. See International Center for Climate Governance,
“Recycling the Auction Revenue from Phases I and II of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme,” 2013.
d European Commission, “Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Progress Towards Achieving the
Kyoto and EU 2020 Objectives,” October 2014.
e European Commission, “State aid SA.38630 (2014/N)—Greece National scheme for the compensation of indirect EU ETS costs,” June 30
2014.A.2 California AB 32 cap-and-trade systemctive period November 2012–2020
overage Large emitters (425,000 t per year) in industry (including reﬁning) and power generation. Natural gas and motor fuel
distributors are included from 2015 onwards. The California cap-and-trade system is estimated by the California Air
Resources Board to include 85 percent of economy-wide emissions.evenue
stream$477m in 2013 from permits auctioned by the state to industrial emitters and motor fuel distributors (including future
vintage permits) at a price of about $11.5 per ton carbon dioxide. Of industrial emission permits, 90 percent were
freely allocated at the outset of the program with the remainder auctioned. State revenues for 2014 were $437m; this
ﬁgure is expected to approximately triple in 2015 due to the inclusion of motor fuel distributors under the cap-and
-trade program.
An additional $557m was raised in 2013 through the state's “consignment” of carbon emission permits to electricity and
natural gas utilities. Consigned permit auction revenues for 2014 were $745m. These groups are granted near-full al-
location of historical emission permits for free by the state, but they are required to then immediately auction those
permits, separately account for that income, and spend it as determined by state regulatory bodies. Income from the
auction of these “consigned” carbon-emission permits can therefore be considered functionally equivalent to govern-
ment revenue.fThe California Legislative Analysts’ Ofﬁce estimates that total auction revenues through 2020 will range from $14–$70b,
depending on future permit prices. Auction results to date have been near the reserve price and so are tracking toward
the lower end of that range. For comparison, this revenue level is similar to the state's current capital gains tax receipts.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 45 percent.- Though California's AB 32 climate legislation was adopted in 2006 and underwent a series of subsequent regulatory
and scoping revisions to establish numerous implementation details, use of revenues from permits directly auctioned by
the state was not addressed in legislation until auctions actually began in 2012. The outcome was that the vast majority
of direct auction revenues (for emissions from the industrial sector, motor fuel distributors, other large emitters) are
earmarked for spending on new climate-change mitigation and adaptation-related programs.
Three billsg from the state legislature established a “Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund” to receive auction revenues. The
California Department of Finance, with coordination by the California Air Resources Board, distributes these funds,
guided by legislative requirements, through annual “Investment Plans” in state-operated “green” projects—state agencies
apply for funds for projects that fall within a set of broadly deﬁned areas with a short application. Legislation deﬁnes
eligible revenue spending to include the following categories:
- Low-carbon transportation and infrastructure;
- Strategic planning for sustainable infrastructure;
- Energy efﬁciency and clean energy;
- Natural resources and solid-waste diversion; and
- Other (local and regional government agency programs, funding of nonproﬁt organizations, and green technology
research, development, and deployment).
FY2013/14-funded projects included $30m for low-carbon transportation projects (e.g., tax rebates to state residents for
J. Carl, D. Fedor / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 50–77 63the purchase electric vehicles) and $30m for a “water-energy efﬁciency water action plan.” Additional disbursements
ramped up in FY2014/15, including an additional: $200m for low-carbon transportation subsidies (primarily increasing
funding levels for an existing program that gives tax rebates for the purchase of zero-emission cars and vouchers for
hybrid and zero-emission trucks and buses as well as funding pre-commercial demonstration project of low carbon
freight transportation); $130m in subsidies for transit-oriented low-income housing construction; $75m in low-income
home weatherization and rooftop solar subsidies; $50m for public mass transit subsidies aimed at increasing ridership
and funding new infrastructure for system connection to the in-development high-speed rail project; $42m for urban
forestry as well as other forest management and tree planting programs; $25m for wetland restoration; $25m for waste
and recycling programs; $20m for publicly owned building energy efﬁciency retroﬁts; and $15 to fund agricultural dairy
digesters and biofuel production standards.hCalifornia's “green” spending approach has also been justiﬁed by appealing to California judicial precedent,i which
suggests that because the cap-and-trade program's supporting legislation was passed by only a simple a majority in the
legislature, auction revenues are in fact “fees” rather than taxes and so must be spent on areas closely related to the goal
of the original legislation. In some respects, then, this was decision by default.
Starting in 2015, the share of revenues that accrue to the state (rather than being consigned to electric utilities) will rise
from about half to three-quarters of total auction proceeds due to the inclusion of fuel distributors. Because almost all
state-auctioned permit revenue expenditures fall within the green spending category, this share is expected to increase
commensurately.
Other earmarks: 25 percent (included within “green spending” category). There are two notable earmarks in Cali-
fornia's revenue spending, though both are contained within the overall “green” spending category and so are not
calculated separately.
First is construction of the San Francisco-to-Los-Angeles high-speed passenger rail system. The California governor
borrowed $500m from the auction revenue fund in 2013 before formal disbursement mechanisms were in place in order
to begin funding this project, with an overall estimated budget of $67b dollars. In FY2014/15, high-speed rail con-
struction was actually the ﬁrst and largest recipient of revenues, at $250m, and 25 percent of all future direct permit
auction proceeds are now slated to go toward this program. The full high-speed rail system is not intended to be
operational until 2029 (after the cap-and-trade program's current 2020 timeframe), however, and the system's overall
greenhouse gas mitigation impacts are uncertain. State agency spending on the rail system therefore technically claims
to comply with legislative and judicial requirements to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions by planting trees to offset
construction-related emissions.jSecond, legislation requires that 25 percent of all Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund expenditures must be used to beneﬁt
the state's “disadvantaged communities,” as deﬁned according to geographic area by the California Environmental
Protection Agency. This requirement was justiﬁed in part by California's original climate legislation declaration that such
communities would be disproportionally burdened by climate change, and the potential for such communities to face
additional local pollution impacts were large emitters to concentrate operations in such areas under a cap-and-trade
system. Agency applications for funds must state how, and estimate what share of, their spending proposals beneﬁt such
communities. Most proposals claim to exceed this 25 percent threshold.
General funds: 4 percent.
- The FY2014/15 state budget requested about $19m from cap-and-trade revenues to fund new stafﬁng positions in
various state agencies to manage the expenditure of new green subsidies.kThe California Air Resources Board imposes a separate AB 32 “Cost of Implementation Fee” of about $40m annually on
major greenhouse gas emitters statewide to cover its own administration costs and those of other implementing
agencies. This fee is separate from cap-and-trade auction revenues and it covers a broader set of expenses than just the
cap-and-trade system.
Revenue Recycling: 55 percent.
- As described above, the value of permits consigned by the state government for auction by investor-owned electric
power utilities and natural gas distributors is required to be used for the “beneﬁt of their ratepayers, consistent with the
goals of AB 32, and may not be used for the beneﬁt of entities or persons other than such ratepayers.”l The California
Public Utilities Commission, which regulates investor-owned utilities, in 2013 required, for example, that 85 percent of
electric power utility funds be returned to residential customers, and 10 percent be returned to small-business custo-
mers, through separately notated biannual “climate dividend” bill credits. The ﬁrst dividends, mailed in 2014, totaled
about $60 per customer annually; the dividend is the same for each customer, regardless of usage or income level. This
relatively unnoticed mechanism has effectively created one of the world's largest carbon-pricing dividends. While
revenue recycling represented the majority of California’s carbon-revenue spending in FY2013/14, however, its share of
total carbon revenue is expected to decline to roughly 30 percent in FY2014/15 and 24 percent in FY2015/16 as the cap-
and-trade program’s coverage broadens signiﬁcantly to include natural gas and transport fuel use. In total, direct rev-
enue recycling is expected to be about 35–40 percent—including consignment to both electric and, in part, natural gas
utilities—over the program’s 2013–2020 implementation period.mf See California Air Resources Board, “Archived Auction Information and Results,” January 2015, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/
auction/auction_archive.htm.
g AB 1532 (Pérez), SB 535 (De León), and SB 1018.
h California Air Resources Board, “Greenhouse Gas Reduction Fund Programs,” September 29, 2014, http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capand
trade/auctionproceeds/summaryproceedsappropriations.pdf.
i California Supreme Court, 1997, Sinclair Paint vs. State Board of Education.
j Letter from Dennis Trujillo, California High Speed Rail Authority, to Cynthia Marvin, California Air Resources Board,, “Greenhouse Gas
J. Carl, D. Fedor / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 50–7764Reduction Fund: High Speed Rail Expenditure Record for Fiscal Year 2014–15,” August 13 2014.
k Mac Taylor for California Legislative Analyst's Ofﬁce (LAO), “The 2014–15 Budget: Cap-and-Trade Auction Revenue Expenditure Plan,”
February 2014.
l AB 32 Final Rule, Cap and Trade Regulations sections 95870(d), 95890, 95892, and 95893.
m California Air Resources Board, “Estimate of State-Auctioned Allowances by Fiscal Year,” December 2, 2013; see also California Air
Resources Board, “Cap and Trade Regulation, Appendix A, Staff Proposal for Allocating Allowances to the Electric Sector,” 7, July 2011.A.3 Regional greenhouse gas initiative (United States)A
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overage This regional cap-and-trade program currently covers emissions from electric power generators greater than 25 MW in
capacity of nine states: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode
Island, and Vermont. It is implemented through separate legislation or regulations in each participating state according
to a common “Model Rule.”evenue
streamAuction revenues for 2013 were about $447m at an average permit clearing price of $2.92, slightly above the $2.00
reserve price and following a period of permit surplus during the country's economic recession.n Cumulatively, auction
proceeds over the period 2008–2014 (including those from New Jersey, which dropped out of the program in 2012) were
$1.94b.
Participating states are allocated permit shares under a shared regional cap and use a common platform for quarterly
auctions. Almost all allocated emission permits are sold at auction (91 percent of total permits for 2014), and states
retain individual discretion on the use of auction revenues, with varying spending patterns.o Some states deposit auction
revenues into and separately administer a purpose-created fund, while others channel them into existing related
spending mechanisms or simply deposit into general funds.se of
revenuesDue to data limitations, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) revenue allocation is reported here in aggregate over the
period 2008–2012 unless otherwise noted.pGreen subsidies: 49 percent.
- Three of the program's “customer beneﬁt investment” target areas can be classiﬁed as green subsidies: energy efﬁ-
ciency (with 46 percent of total revenues) followed by “clean and renewable energy” (4 percent, including ﬁnancing
programs for rooftop solar), and various other greenhouse gas emission mitigation-related expenditures (also 4 percent).
Energy efﬁciency is by far the largest spending category under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative with beneﬁciaries
in both business and residential sectors. Eight of the nine member states spend the majority of their auction revenues on
energy-efﬁciency programs, with Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont each earmarking
over 90 percent of total funds for this one category. Examples of subsidized programs include household and business
energy audits, low-income home weatherization programs, lighting and appliance retail rebates, job training, and
speciﬁc building projects.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- There are no known signiﬁcant unrelated spending earmarks apart from programs speciﬁcally targeted at low-income
households, small businesses, or public-sector entities that has otherwise already been categorized here as either green
spending or revenue recycling.
General funds: 13–32 percent.
- About 9 percent of auction revenues have been transferred by individual participating states to their own general
funds, and a further 4 percent of revenues have been spent on joint and state-level program administration costs. Of
collected revenues, 18 percent at the time of accounting had not yet been spent or earmarked by participating states.
New Jersey, before withdrawing from the cap-and-trade program in 2012, directed most of its auction revenues toward
the state's general fund.qRevenue Recycling: 12 percent.
- The fourth category of the program's “customer beneﬁt investments” is utility bill “assistance,”which can be considered
a form of revenue recycling as it directly transfers revenues to a broad set of the population affected by carbon pricing.
Implementations vary by state with some programs focused on on-bill subsidies speciﬁcally for low-income households
or small business whereas others are universal. From 2008–2013, $122m was spent on this category to 2.3 million
customers. Maryland stands out as the only state to return more of its auction revenues through utility rate relief—
nearly two-thirds—than it spends on energy efﬁciency programs.n Potomac Economics for RGGI Inc, “Annual Report On The Market For RGGI CO2 Allowances: 2013,” May 2014.
o RGGI Inc,, “2014 CO2 Allowance Allocation,” December 11, 2014.
p Data derived from RGGI Inc, “Regional Investment of RGGI CO2 Allowance Proceeds, 2012,” February 2014.
q Revenue spending for New Jersey is not included in the overall share estimates presented here.A.4 Chinese provincial emission trading scheme pilotsctive period 2013–ongoing
overage Three of the seven currently operating Chinese provincial cap-and-trade systems generate government revenues
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Rules vary by province, though many are similar to the California AB 32 cap-and-trade systems coverage of greenhouse
gas emitters exceeding 25,000 t annually.evenue
streamFor Guangdong Province, revenues over the six monthly auctions from December 2013 to May 2014 totaled $95m (CNY
586m). In a unique approach to permit allocation that is perhaps intended to provide both market signaling and create
an effective ceiling price, Guangdong in FY2013/14 required covered entities to purchase at least 3 percent of allocations
at government auction (with reserve price of CNY 60, $9.70 per ton carbon dioxide) before being allowed to trade any
of their remaining freely allocated permits. In 2015, the required auction share is set to grow to 10 percent. The current
Guangdong secondary market permit-trading price is about CNY 21 ($3.40) per ton carbon dioxide (as of December
2014), having fallen dramatically since the program's launch.
Revenue from the ﬁrst Hubei Province auction in March 2014 was $6.5m (CNY 40m). Secondary market trading prices
are about CNY 24 ($3.90) per ton carbon dioxide-equivalent (as of December 2014) and are basically stable.
Shenzhen was set to begin auctioning 3 percent of allocated permits from 2014. Revenue ﬁgures are unknown.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: less than 10 percent.- Hubei reported that 30 percent of auction revenues would by used to fund “corporate carbon reduction,” carbon market
regulation, and carbon trading administration. While the ﬁrst of these categories would likely classify as an energy
efﬁciency subsidy, its share of total revenues is unknown.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- Unknown.
General funds: 90 percent.
- In addition to the administration costs outlined for Hubei revenues, described above, Shenzhen is said to be using
auction revenues to “support capacity building.”r Remaining funds from other jurisdictions are presumably also used to
fund administrative costs or else contribute to general government budgets.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- Unknown.r Tang Jin, “Decision Making and Policy Choice in China ETS,” Presented at the World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness Conference,
Mexico City, May 8, 2014.A.5 Quebec cap-and-trade system for emission allowancesctive period January 2013–2020
overage Quebec's current cap-and-trade program is largely harmonized with the California AB 32 cap-and-trade system through
a regional partnership known as the Western Climate Initiative. As in California, large emitters exceeding 25,000 t
annually are covered, as are fuel distributors from 2015.evenue
streamAuction revenues for FY2013/14 totaled $100m (CAD 106.5m) at an average permit clearing price of CAD 11.21 ($10.50,
representing current and future vintage sales for the program's ﬁrst four quarterly auctions).s The clearing price in each
auction was the minimum reserve price. Though Quebec has held its own auctions from December 2013, it began joint
auctions with California in November 2014. With 95 percent hydropower, however, Quebec has not adopted California's
“consigned” permit auction approach in the power sector.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 100 percent.- Quebec's auction revenues are transferred into an existing provincial “Green Fund” that was established in 2006. Before
the introduction of cap-and-trade auction revenues, the Green Fund had annual average expenditures of about $186m
(CAD 200m), so this new funding source represents about half of existing expenditures. Within the fund, cap-and-trade
auction revenues are speciﬁcally earmarked to ﬁnance those (1) greenhouse gas emission mitigation and (2) climate
change adaptation measures outlined in the province's “2013–2020 Climate Change Action Plan.” The plan has a total
budget exceeding $2.8b (CAD 3b) and broad coverage across thirty different “priorities.”
The provincial Ministry of Sustainable development, Environment and the Fight against Climate Change administers
distribution of auction funds to other provincial ministries and government entities. The administering ministry is re-
quired to report annually on the results of the funds it distributes, while recipient ministries must implement “internal
procedures” managing the use of funds. Thirteen different government spending programs are currently listed as being
at least partially funded by cap-and-trade revenues across the following categories: transport, energy efﬁciency, “green
energy,” research and development, and the waste sector. Of these, transport reports the most activity, with programs on
freight efﬁciency, electric vehicles, public transit, and cycling, implemented across four different government entities.tOther earmarks: 0 percent.
- There are no known unrelated earmarks on Quebec cap-and-trade revenues.
General funds: 0 percent.
- The use of auction revenues to cover program administration costs is unknown.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- There are no known direct revenue recycling programs currently funded under the administering ministry's Green
Fund.
J. Carl, D. Fedor / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 50–7766s Derived from data contained in “Auction of Quebec Greenhouse Gas Emission Units Summary Reports published by the Quebec
Ministry of Sustainable development, Environment and the Fight against Climate Change on December 2013, March 2014, May 2014, and
August 2014.
t Ministère du Développement durable, de l’Environnement, et de la Lutte contre la changement climatique (MDDELCC), “Programmes
related to the ﬁght against climate change,” January 2015, http://www.mddelcc.gouv.qc.ca/changementsclimatiques/programs.htm.A.6 Alberta greenhouse gas reduction programA
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period:2007–ongoingoverage Greenhouse gas emitters exceeding 100,000 t annually — mostly oil sands producers mining product for export—are
required to reduce their overall emissions intensity by 12 percent over a 6 year period. Emitters that do not meet this
performance target may, among other options (including the trade of emissions performance credits), make compliance
payments at a set price to the government.uevenue
streamAlberta collected about $92m (CAD 99m) in 2013 from emitters that chose to comply with emission reduction re-
quirements by contributing to the provincial Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund at a set price of CAD 15
($14) per ton carbon dioxide of required emissions reduction. Because covered emitters routinely chose to meet
compliance obligations through this set volumetric payment option, the Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program
could also be considered as much a carbon tax (on marginal emissions only) as a cap-and-trade program. The fund has
collected CAD 503m ($470m at y2013 exchange rates) in total from 2007–2013.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 90 percent.- Revenues collected in the Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund are administered by an independent
purpose-created entity called the Climate Change and Emissions Management Corporation. This arms-length non-
governmental entity distributes funds annually through an “expression of interest” application process to co-invested,
nongovernment-funded, climate and environment-related technology research, development, and demonstration
projects.
Many funding recipients are located within Alberta while some are international. Speciﬁc fund focus areas include the
development of new technology in both supply- and demand-side energy efﬁciency, carbon capture and sequestration,
and reducing the overall environmental footprint of energy production. Recipient projects are selected competitively
through a multistage internal and third-party expert review, with required progress reporting, including project de-
scription and accounting on a public website. Under the funding agreement, the Climate Change and Emissions Man-
agement Fund receives access to reports and technical data in return for its project investment but not intellectual
property rights to the technology.
Eighty-eight technology research, development, and demonstration projects have been funded to date. Examples in-
clude: research and development undertaken by an Albertan company into “binary ﬂuid injector” thermal refrigeration
technologies that could improve industrial energy efﬁciency; the ﬁrst pilot project by a small Calgary-based startup
demonstrating new direct air carbon dioxide capture technology; research by the University of California Riverside into
stable catalysts to convert carbon dioxide and methane into liquid methanol fuel; demonstration by the Canadian
Fertilizer Institute of a comprehensive farm fertilizer management program designed to reduce agricultural nitrous
oxide emissions; and implementation of commercial-scale manure-to-biogas bioreﬁnery in southern Alberta. To date,
the renewable and clean energy project categories have received 68 percent of total funding, many of them in the
market demonstration or commercialization stages.vCompared to other global carbon-revenue programs, Alberta's approach to using its revenue on “green” issues is notable.
It focuses speciﬁcally on subsidizing the development of greenhouse gas emission mitigation technologies, it does not
fund any new government-run programs or bureaucracy, and it includes robust screening and reporting requirements
for recipients that are located both within and outside of the province.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- There are no known unrelated earmarks on Alberta's greenhouse gas reduction program revenues.
General funds: 10 percent.
- Administration costs for the Climate Change and Emissions Management Corporation are about $8–9m (CAD 9–10m)
per year.wRevenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- As much of the covered entities’ production is exported, Alberta does not implement direct revenue-recycling pro-
grams under its Climate Change and Emissions Management Fund.u Province of Alberta, “Climate change and emission mitigation act: Speciﬁed gas emitters regulation,” Alberta regulation 139/2007,
with amendments up to and including Alberta Regulation 225/2014, http://www.qp.alberta.ca/documents/Regs/2007_139.pdf.
v Climate Change and Emissions Management Corporation (CCEMC) website, “Portfolio of Funded Projects,” http://ccemc.ca/projects/.
w CCEMC, “Climate Change and Emissions Management Corporation 2014–2017 Business Plan,” April 2014.
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overage The Swiss cap-and-trade system was introduced in 2008 as an opt-in alternative to an existing and more extensive
carbon tax (see below) and is focused on large, energy-intensive industrial emitters. It is structured similarly to Eur-
opean Union Emission Trading System.evenue
stream- Revenues from the ﬁrst two permit auctions held in May and November 2014 totaled $9.1m (CHF 8.3m) at permit
clearing prices of CHF 40.25 and CHF 20.00 ($44 and $22), respectively.x
- The Swiss cap-and-trade system had full free allocation (and so no public revenues) until 2012. Thereafter, it shifted to
20 percent permit auctioning, set to rise gradually to 70 percent auctioning by 2020. Power sector emission permits are
fully auctioned, and auctions are held several times each year.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- Unknown
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- Unknown
General funds: 100 percent.
- Revenue use from permit auctioning is not explicitly publicly documented and so is assumed to contribute toward
general funds.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- Unknownx Calculated from data presented on the Federal Ofﬁce for the Environment (FOEN) English language website, “Emission allowance
auction results,” http://www.bafu.admin.ch/emissionshandel/05545/12435/index.html?lang¼en.A.8 Other cap-and-trade systems
New Zealand emission trading system
The New Zealand Emission Trading System was phased in across economic sectors from 2008–2013. Permit allocation was a mix of free
allocation and government window sales to meet any compliance shortfalls at a set price of NZD 12.5 ($15 at y2013 exchange rates) per
ton carbon dioxide equivalent. Revenues of about $2.6m (NZD 3.5m) in total were collected from government sales of 129,500 t of
credits in 2010 and 147,000 t in 2011. As overall market permit trading prices fell to about NZD 1.25 ($1.50) per ton in 2012, reﬂecting
oversupply, no government revenue from sales has been generated since then. It is unclear how revenues collected were spent by the New
Zealand government, but are likely to have contributed to administrative costs or other general funds.
Japanese municipal emission trading systemsVarious Japanese municipalities, including Tokyo since 2010 and Saitama Prefecture since 2011, have launched cap-and-trade systems
focused on large energy users. Permit allocation is largely free and based on both existing emissions levels and the level already-achieved
corporate emission reductions. Covered entities may buy offsets to meet compliance, but the level of public revenues, if any, is unknown.
Kazakhstan emission trading systemKazakhstan has launched a carbon cap-and-trade system, but all permits are currently freely allocated. Auction revenues are antici-
pated beginning in 2016, but revenue-spending plans are unknown.
Korea emission trading systemThe Korean cap-and-trade system launched in January 2015 and focuses on power generators, large industrial emitters exceeding
100,000 t annually, and airlines. All permits are freely allocated through 2018 and so no auction revenues are anticipated before that time.Appendix B. Carbon tax system revenuesa
B.1 Australia carbon-pricing mechanism (canceled)ctive period July 2012–July 2014
overage Large emitters (425,000 t per year) in the energy extraction (including fugitive emissions), power generation, in-
dustrial, and waste sectors; all natural gas suppliers. Agricultural sector excluded. Domestic aviation, shipping, and rail
were included but not household or commercial light vehicle fuel use or off-road fuel use. Estimated to include 60
percent of economy-wide emissions.bevenue
stream$8.79b (AUD 9.08b) per year was originally forecast to be raised in FY2013/14 from an AUD $24.15 ($23.40) per metric
ton carbon dioxide-equivalent levy.c Actual receipts in FY2012/13 were $6.8b (AUD 6.6b), and revised Australian gov-
ernment budget forecasts for FY2013/14 put expected revenues at $7.0b (AUD 7.2b).dse of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 15 percent.- As planned based upon original projections of FY2013/2014 carbon tax receipts of $8.79b (AUD 9.08b), new climate,
energy use, and environmental initiatives included the creation of a “Clean Energy Finance Corporation” to help fund
deployment of renewable and low-carbon power generation, energy efﬁciency infrastructure, and direct subsidies to the
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facturing and low-carbon technology deployment for businesses, while a smaller program subsidized household energy
efﬁciency upgrades. A series of land-use measures were also funded, including a biodiversity fund and “Carbon Farming
Initiative” carbon sink and offset scheme.
Other earmarks: 45 percent.
- The Australian carbon tax was notable for how much of the collected tax revenues were earmarked to be spent on
“transitional subsidies” for Australia's trade-exposed or otherwise carbon-intensive domestic industries. Major initiatives
designed to do this included a “Jobs and Competitiveness Program” to assist industry (largely steel and aluminum
producers), a “Coal Sector Jobs Package” focused on mines, and an “Energy Security Fund” to allocate free carbon units
and cash payments to coal-ﬁred power generators who publish “Clean Energy Investment Plans” and that was also
intended to be used to negotiate the closure (i.e., buyout) of about 2 gigawatts of the most inefﬁcient coal facilities by
2020.
General funds: 1 percent.
- Establishment of a “Clean Energy Regulator” and other carbon tax administrative costs.
Revenue Recycling: 53 percent.
- The Australian government termed revenue recycling “household assistance” and was presented as compensating
households for the higher costs associated with the carbon tax policy. Such household assistance included: (1) increases
in pensions, allowances, and “family payments”; and (2) income-tax cuts for annual incomes less than AUD 80,000
($77,400), including raising the tax-free threshold for lower income brackets. According to government estimates, the
average household received AUD $10.10 ($9.80) per week through these measures. It also increased the small business
instant asset tax write-off.a This appendix outlines author estimates of revenues from global carbon tax systems (in most cases as of 2013), as well as their uses.
Please see the World Bank, 2014 annual “State and Trends of Carbon Pricing” report for updated details on other carbon tax system design
elements. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/25053834/state-trends-carbon-pricing-2015.
b The Australia carbon tax system, from introduction, was originally scheduled to gradually transition into an internationally-linked
cap-and-trade program with a relatively narrow price ceiling and ﬂoor after three years. This transition, which was described by the
government primarily as a cost-limiting measure for industry and opportunity for the Australian agriculture industry to sell offsets abroad,
was never implemented. It is also notable that the Australian carbon tax was implemented amid broader national tax reforms. See Jeremy
Carl and David Fedor, “Revenue-Neutral Carbon Taxes in the Real World,” The Hoover Institution, 2012.
c Australia Government, “Clean Future Final Plan,” 2011.
d Australian Financial Review, “$7.6bn-a-year budget cost to chop carbon tax,” February 15 2014.B.2 Sweden carbon dioxide taxctive period 1991–ongoing
overage One of the oldest global carbon taxes, Sweden's covers fossil fuels used for heating and transport. Similar to the other
long-lived Nordic carbon taxes, Sweden employs exemptions and design modiﬁcations for energy-intensive industries
designed to reduce leakage. The resulting effective tax rates for industry have generally been around one-third to one-
quarter that faced by residential energy consumers.eevenue
stream$3.68b (SEK 24b) in 2013, up from about $1.3 billion per year in 1993 following the program's launch, but relatively
stable since 2003; the current tax represents 0.7 percent of Swedish GDP from a 2014 general carbon tax rate was SKR
1076 ($157) per ton carbon dioxide. Sweden's carbon dioxide tax is generally described as a complement to the
existing Swedish energy tax.fse of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- No known earmarks to subsidize new green spending.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 50 percent.
- Revenues from the carbon and energy taxes make up a signiﬁcant portion of total government receipts and contribute
toward the country's general budget. They are considered an integrated part of the tax system and are among the most
“revenue generation-focused” of global carbon-pricing systems, even though consumption-behavior change was also
acknowledged as a goal of the tax's creation.
Administrative costs of Sweden's carbon and energy taxes together are estimated at 0.1 percent of total revenues.
Making the taxes administratively simple for both government and taxpayers was an original design priority of the
policies.gRevenue Recycling: 50 percent.
- Sweden enacted personal income-tax reductions in 1991 alongside the introduction of the carbon tax, though the net
effect at that time was nevertheless an increase in the overall tax burden. In 2001, employer social security contributions
were also reduced, and income-tax-free allowances were extended, alongside further carbon tax reforms and increases.
This latter adjustment was described by the government as a “green tax shift.”h A further labor tax for carbon tax shift
occurred over the period 2007–2010, and as before the reductions in labor tax revenues were much larger than new
A
C
R
U
J. Carl, D. Fedor / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 50–77 69gains in carbon tax revenues.i There is, however, no direct link established between carbon tax revenue and “funding”
these concurrent labor tax cuts, so the above revenue share is only a rough attribution.
The Swedish government also notes that its existing energy taxes on vehicle fuels have since 2000 been lowered as the
carbon tax rate on vehicle fuels was increased.je Eurostat in 2003 reviewed Nordic carbon and energy taxes, documenting both the substantial variation in effective carbon tax
burdens across sectors and the share of environmental tax revenues at that time which could be attributed to the carbon dioxide versus
other energy taxes. For example, they estimate that 1999 carbon dioxide taxes accounted for approximately one-ﬁfth to one-quarter total
energy tax revenues in each of Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark, with Sweden having the highest share at 0.7 percent carbon tax as
a share of GDP (5.1 percent of all government tax revenue) and Finland and Denmark the lowest with 0.4 percent of GDP. (Eurostat,
“Energy Taxes in the Nordic Countries: Does the polluter pay?” March 2003.) Speck and Jilkova offer a further accounting of the evolution
of Scandinavian carbon and energy taxes through the 1990s and early 2000s. (Stephan Speck and Jirina Jilkova, “Design of Environmental
Tax Reforms in Europe,” in Carbon-Energy Taxation: Lessons from Europe, edited by Mikael Skou Andersen and Paul Ekins, 2009.)
f Statistics Sweden, “Environmentally motivated subsidies and preliminary environmental taxes 2013,” May 2014.
g Henrik Hammar and Susanne Ackerfeldt, “CO2 Taxation in Sweden,” 2011.
h Ministry of Environment of Sweden, “Sweden's Fourth National Communication on Climate Change,” 2005.
i Susanne Akerfeldt for the Ministry of Finance of Sweden, “Swedish energy and CO2 taxes National design within an EU framework”
Conference on Environmentally Related Taxes and Fiscal Reform, Rome, December 15 2011
j Ministry of Environment of Sweden, “Sweden's Fifth National Communication on Climate Change,” 2009.B.3 Norway carbon dioxide taxctive period 1991–ongoing
overage Another of the early Nordic country carbon taxes, Norway's carbon tax covers the use of oil, gasoline, and natural gas,
with partial exemptions for European Union Emissions Trading System-covered operations. It is estimated to cover 55
percent of the economy's emissions.k The level of the tax varies broadly by fuel and sector; one speciﬁc element is to
target energy-usage patterns by offshore oil producers. In this sense it is not a broad-based general carbon tax despite its
incidence being tied to carbon content or emissions.lNorway now also separately reports a “carbon dioxide” component of its motor vehicle registration taxes, which is not
included here.evenue
streamAnnual revenues of about $1.58b (NKR 9.3b) in 2013 from the combined general carbon taxes on fuel and on offshore
oil production from a 2014 tax rate of NKR 25-419 ($4-$67) per ton carbon dioxide, depending on fuel type and
usage.m For example, offshore oil producers since 2013 have faced a special “carbon tax” rate of NKR 200 ($34) for their
platform-based oil- and natural gas-ﬁred power generation operations; the Norwegian government has applied this tax
rate to incentivize these producers to instead build electric transmission lines from the mainland grid, which is almost
completely hydropower.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 30 percent.- When carbon tax rates were raised in 2013, additional revenues were earmarked into expanding the capital base for
the government's existing “Green Fund for Climate, Renewable Energy and Energy Efﬁciency Measures” (actual carbon
tax revenue increase from 2012 to 2013 was $454m, mostly from offshore petroleum producers). Annual ﬁnancial
returns on this fund are then spent to subsidize green technology projects by a purpose-created government body
named “Enova.” Targeted green spending areas include renewables, energy efﬁciency, and low-carbon research and
development.
The 2015 Norwegian budget further outlines support for clean technology deployment in the industry sector (so-called
“risk reduction measures”), wind power deployment subsidies, passenger rail subsidies, urban transit subsidies, carbon
capture and storage (CCS) demonstration projects, and additional funding for existing government funds focused on
food security, agriculture, and forestry in developing countries.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 40 percent.
- Carbon tax revenues that are not otherwise earmarked for green subsidies or estimated to offset existing tax are
assumed to contribute towards government general funds.
Revenue Recycling: 30 percent.
- In addition to the green subsidies described above, the 2015 budget also described the use of carbon tax revenues to
fund reductions in the corporate income tax (the so-called “capital tax”). The above revenue share is only a rough
attribution of this tax shift based upon incomplete date.k World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), “Putting a price on carbon with a tax,” 2014.
l See Gert Tinggaard Svendsen,, Carsten Daugbjerg, Lene Hjøllund, and Anders Branth Pedersen, “Consumers, Industrialists and the
Political Economy of Green Taxation: CO2 taxation in OECD,” Energy Policy, 2001, 29(6):489-497 for a discussion of political dynamics
around the numerous adjustments to the carbon energy taxes in Finland following its introduction.
m Statistics Norway Statbank, “Environmental economic instruments,” January 2015.
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overage The tax covers only fossil fuels used for power generation on the island of Great Britain and overlaps with European
Union Emission Trading System liability. It was introduced to provide a carbon price ﬂoor and market stability in the
power sector given the volatility and low level of European cap-and-trade system permit prices.
The United Kingdom has since 2001 also applied a separate “Climate Change Levy” to nonresidential ﬁnal consumption
of electricity, natural gas, and solid fuels. Rates are set according to each fuel but do not necessarily correspond to carbon
content and have changed over time. We therefore do not consider it a carbon tax. This levy, originally intended to be
revenue-neutral, was launched alongside a 0.3 percent reduction in employer national insurance contributions.n In fact,
the Climate Change Levy was revenue-negative, as its annual revenues of $1.29b (GBP 700 m) over the period 2006–
2009 were less than the $2.49b (GBP 1.35b) cost of the national insurance contribution reduction from 12.2 percent to
11.9 percent.oevenue
streamFY2013/14 revenues of $1.53b (GBP 975m) from a tax rate of GBP 9.55 ($15.70) per ton carbon dioxide. The tax rate is
set to update annually such that the sum of Carbon Price Floor and the European Union Emission Trading System permit
price exceeded a minimum price threshold of GBP 16 ($26.30) per ton carbon dioxide in 2013, rising to GBP 18
($29.60) per ton in 2016. The price ﬂoor was recently frozen at the GBP 18 per ton level through 2020. The United
Kingdom Treasury estimates that revenues will rise to $2.34b (GBP 1.42b) in FY2014/15 and $3.34b (GBP 2.03b) in
FY2015/16, depending on price differentials with the European cap-and-trade system.pse of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- Unknown
Other earmarks: 15 percent.
- Alongside the launch of the carbon tax, the UK government introduced a “compensation for indirect costs of energy
and climate change policies for energy-intensive industries” subsidy program of about GBP 100m ($165m) per year
through 2015. The spending program had an initial ceiling of GBP 250m ($411m); half was earmarked to offset the
indirect costs to energy-intensive industries of the carbon price ﬂoor's effect on electricity prices, and the other half was
intended to offset costs associated with the European Union Emission Trading System. While funding for this pool of
money is separate from the revenues generated by the carbon tax itself (it is described as having an ad hoc budget
composed of the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change's one-time budgetary “underspend” with the rest
coming from the UK Treasury), overall carbon tax revenues appear fungible enough for this to be considered functionally
linked spending.
General funds: 85 percent.
- The use of tax revenues was not explicitly promoted in the launch of the pricing system and subsequent government
documents have described revenues as being retained by the UK Treasury as general tax revenue.qRevenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- Unlike the 0.3-percentage-point reduction in employer national insurance contributions enacted alongside the earlier
Climate Change Levy (described above), there are no known offsetting tax-reduction measures explicitly associated with
the Carbon Price Floor.n United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Paciﬁc (UNESCAP), “Addressing Competitiveness in introducing
ETR: United Kingdom's climate change levy,” 2012.
o Jenny Sumner, Lori Bird, and Hillary Smith, “Carbon Taxes: A Review of Experience and Policy Design Considerations,” National
Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), December 2009.
p Elena Ares for the Library of the House of Commons Science and Environment Section, “Carbon Price Floor,” May 2014. See also HM
Revenue and Customs, “Climate Change Levy (CCL) & Carbon Price Floor (CPF) Bulletin, January 2015,” February 24, 2015
q “All revenue retained by treasury.” Ibid.B.5 British Columbia carbon tax shift/revenue-neutral carbon taxctive period 2008–2017
overage Designed to have a broad coverage base, British Columbia's carbon tax covers 70–75 percent of provincial anthropogenic
emissions.r The tax itself is applied upstream on each fuel, with relatively minor exemptions or rebates granted for
international marine and air transportation, non-energy fuel use, biofuels, and some other use cases. It therefore applies
in almost every sector across the economy.sevenue
streamAnnual carbon tax revenues were expected to be $1.10b (CAD 1.21b) in FY2013/14 from a CAD 30 ($28) per ton carbon
dioxide-equivalent tax level, ﬁxed since FY2012/13. This represents about 3 percent of the provincial government budget
and slightly over 0.5 percent of gross regional product.tRevenues from the carbon tax are administered by the British Columbia Ministry of Finance and reported in forward-
looking comprehensive budget plans, with annual revisions. Use of revenues was largely established alongside the
original formation of the carbon tax. In fact, a major justiﬁcation for the carbon tax at its outset was to use revenues to
reduce the marginal corporate tax rate relative to other Canadian provinces in order to boost economic competitiveness.
British Columbia's carbon tax shift program is notable for being net revenue-negative, a fact noted by the provincial
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negative to the provincial government by $116m (CAD 120m), and in FY2013/14 was expected to be $18m (CAD 20m)
revenue-negative. In the program's initial years, the program stipulated that the minister of ﬁnance's personal salary
would be docked if more revenues were collected by the tax than were recycled directly back into the economy.use of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- No new environmental, renewable energy, energy efﬁciency, or other clean technology spending is funded by carbon
tax revenues.
Other earmarks: 21–42 percent.
- The carbon tax shift has near-universal coverage and a straightforward approach to revenue use. Some earmarks,
however, have been introduced over the years as particularly impacted groups successfully campaign for relief from the
tax. These groups or focus areas do not receive exemption from the tax, nor are they beneﬁciaries of new program
spending, but they do receive targeted tax credits. A few have become signiﬁcant: FY2013/14 examples include a
“children's ﬁtness and arts” tax credit of $7.2m (CAD 8m), a “small business venture capital” tax credit of $2.7m (CAD 3m),
and seemingly unrelated business subsector tax credits including an “interactive digital media” business tax credit of
$57m (CAD 63m) and provincial ﬁlm industry tax credits of almost $141m (CAD 156 m). Apparently at least some of
these targeted tax expenditures existed under separate budgetary authority before being funded by the carbon tax.vTwo other types of direct payments or targeted tax cuts have existed in the carbon tax program since its outset but could
be considered earmarks. Residents in the rural northern parts of the province, who require additional fuel use to heat
their homes in the winter, each year receive a direct stipend of CAD $200 ($182; for a total annual cost of $63m, CAD
69m). Low-income residents also receive targeted tax cuts totaling $176m (CAD $194m) each year.
General funds: 0 percent.
- No speciﬁc funding is known to be identiﬁed from the carbon tax revenues for administrative overhead or other
supplements to the provincial general fund.
Revenue Recycling: 102 percent.
More revenues than are actually collected under the tax are recycled under the overall carbon tax shift program to
individuals and business through a combination of direct payments, reductions in marginal tax rates, and other targeted
tax credits.
In total, individuals were set to receive $473m (CAD 522m) in payments and tax beneﬁts for FY2013/14. The most
signiﬁcant broad-based revenue recycling measure in addition to the more narrowly targeted measures described above
include a 5-percentage-point reduction in the ﬁrst two tiers of personal income-tax rate.
Businesses, meanwhile, receive their own broad tax-rate cuts, including a small business income-tax-rate cut from
4.5 percent to 2.5 percent, industrial and farm property tax credits, and a cut in the general corporate income-tax rate
from 12 percent to 10 percent (this was partially reversed, however, in 2013, when the corporate income-tax rate was
raised back to 11 percent). These business tax changes totaled $643m (CAD 710m) in FY2013/14.r Canada National Inventory Report to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC), 2011.
s British Columbia in 2007 made a political commitment towards a North American regional carbon cap-and-trade system by joining
the Western Climate Initiative after the Premier visited then-California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. Following deliberations with
local stakeholders and experts, the Premier subsequently personally championed a provincial carbon tax instead, and details of integration
with a potential future cap-and-trade system were left unresolved. UBC’s Kathryn Harrison has published a number of illuminating
investigations into the political economy of this and other decisions made in the British Columbia carbon tax system.
t British Columbia Ministry of Finance, “Budget and Fiscal Plan 2014/15–2016/17,” February 18, 2014.
u Similar to some of the other carbon pricing cases discussed here, British Columbia’s carbon tax was introduced amid a broader
comprehensive provincial tax reform package as well as new fuel taxes, which in some cases exceeded the consumer cost impact from the
carbon tax. See Jeremy Carl and David Fedor, “Revenue-Neutral Carbon Taxes in the Real World,” The Hoover Institution, 2012
v Kathryn Harrison, “The Political Economy of British Columbia’s Carbon Tax,” OECD Working Paper, November 2012.B.6 Denmark carbon dioxide tax actctive period 1992–ongoing
overage Denmark's carbon tax covers emissions from the use of oil, natural gas, coal, electricity, and waste incineration. When
originally introduced, the Danish carbon tax largely displaced components of an existing energy tax. The carbon tax's
coverage was then signiﬁcantly expanded under the 1996 “Green Tax Package.” Today, the carbon dioxide and energy
taxes are administered as complements.evenue
stream$1b (DKK 5.5b in 2010) per year from a DKK 167 ($31) per ton carbon dioxide tax rate in 2014.w The tax rate is
currently set to rise by 1.8 percent annually.
Tax rates are not consistent among users: they are lower for energy-intensive industrial users and higher for space
heating. Businesses can also signiﬁcantly reduce their tax burdens by voluntarily entering into energy-efﬁciency-im-
provement agreements with the Danish Energy Authority, though the terms of this exemption have changed over time.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 5–10 percent.- Of the $256m in additional revenues gained from increasing the carbon dioxide tax in the 1996 Green Tax Package (see
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subsidies of up to 30 percent of private investment costs.x This was the most signiﬁcant revenue earmark for green
spending established over the course of the Danish carbon tax.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- Energy-intensive industries beneﬁt from signiﬁcantly reduced carbon tax rates, which is sometimes referred to as a
“carbon tax rebate.” Only the reduced tax rate is counted here in the above estimate of total tax revenue, and so the
reduction is not considered an industry earmark.
General funds: 45–50 percent.
- Most of the carbon tax revenues contribute toward the government's general budget. Because the tax was developed
with the aim of reducing the government's overall reliance on labor taxes, however, we ascribe roughly half of the
revenues to each category (see below).
The Danish Energy Authority estimated that as 2000, about 1.5 percent of carbon tax revenues were needed for public
administration costs, alongside additional private sector administration costs estimated at 1–2 percent of the total
carbon tax burden.yRevenue Recycling: 45 percent.
- Both personal income tax and employer social security contributions have been reduced in stages over carbon tax
implementation period. The ﬁrst stage of the carbon tax (1992–93) came alongside signiﬁcant reductions in labor taxes
and so revenues can be considered to be fully recycled. Expansion in carbon tax revenues from the second stage Green
Tax Package reforms (1996) was also largely used to offset new labor tax cuts—$278 in new revenues were directed
toward reductions in the income tax and tax on self-employment as of the year 2000—but some revenues were re-
turned to industry as subsidies (see above). The third-stage reforms (1998), which increased the carbon tax rate, were
also returned to the economy.zThough reducing these other taxes was stated as an original goal of expanding carbon and energy taxes, carbon tax
revenues do not directly fund other labor tax reductions. Labor tax reductions have generally exceeded any new carbon
tax revenues generated.aaw Danish Energy Agency, “Energy Efﬁciency Policies and Measures in Denmark,” October 2012. Other historical revenue estimates
include: $695m in the year 1999 (Eurostat, “Energy Taxes in the Nordic Countries: Does the polluter pay?,” March 2003) and $905m in
2008 from a rate of about DKR 100 ($20) per ton carbon dioxide (Jenny Sumner, Lori Bird, and Hillary Smith, “Carbon Taxes: A Review of
Experience and Policy Design Considerations,” National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), December 2009).
x Danish Energy Authority, “Green Taxes In Trade And Industry—Danish Experiences,” 2002
y Ibid.
z Stefan Speck, “The Design of Carbon and Broad-Based Energy Taxes in European Countries,” Vermont Journal of Environmental Law,
Volume 10, 2008.
aa Stefan Speck and Jirina Jilkova, “Design of Environmental Tax Reforms in Europe,” Oxford Scholarship Online, February 2010B.7 Switzerland Carbon Dioxide Levyctive period 2008–ongoing
overage Switzerland taxes carbon dioxide emissions exceeding a set percentage of a regulated ﬁrm's 1990 emission level. Fossil
fuels used in heating and power generation are covered, but not those used in the transportation sector. A newer,
parallel Swiss cap-and-trade system (see above) allows large industry emitters to opt out of the carbon tax. Switzerland
does not participate in the European Union's Emission Trading System.evenue
stream $875m in 2014 (CHF 800m) from a tax rate of CHF 60 ($56) per ton carbon dioxide emissions. This rate has
increased gradually from CHF 12 ($11.20) per ton in 2008 to CHF 36 ($33.50) per ton over the period 2010–2013, and
the Swiss government has held out the possibility of continued future increases based on the country’s performance in
hitting carbon dioxide emission reduction targets.abse of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 33 percent.- Since the program's outset, Switzerland has earmarked a share of carbon tax revenues to subsidize building-sector
energy use reductions, either through energy efﬁciency or distributed renewable power generation. For the period
2008–2012, a maximum of CHF 200m (186m) were dedicated to building-sector emission reduction measures. For the
period 2013–2020, one-third of total carbon tax revenues (with a cap of CHF 300m, $280m per year) are similarly
earmarked—one-third of that for deployment of renewables and two-thirds for building energy efﬁciency. Only com-
panies that face compliance obligations under the levy scheme are eligible to claim such funding.
A further budget of CHF 25m ($23.3m) per year is earmarked for a loan guarantee green “Technology Fund.”
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 0 percent.
- Unknown.
Revenue Recycling: 67 percent.
- For the period 2013–2020, the remaining two-thirds of carbon tax revenues not spent on building-sector green sub-
sidies are “redistributed to the public and companies”ac in the form of household-level lump sum rebates and employer
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0.573 percent, while the general public received a ﬂat carbon tax rebate of $50.55 (CHF 46.20) per “insured person”
(totaling $414m, CHF 379m), distributed through the country's mandatory basic health insurance system (a mechanism
already employed to issue rebates funded by Switzerland’s separate “volatile organic compound” tax).adab The Federal Assembly of the Swiss Confederation, “Federal law on the reduction of CO 2 emissions(CO 2 law): 641.71,” December 23,
2011, in German. https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classiﬁed-compilation/20120090/.
ac World Bank Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), “Putting a price on carbon with a tax,” December 2014.
ad See Swiss Federal Ofﬁce for the Environment, “Topic: CO2 Levy,” in German, http://www.bafu.admin.ch/co2-abgabe.B.8 Mexico special tax on production and servicesctive period January 2014–ongoing
overage Mexico's carbon tax is intended to cover only the carbon content of fossil fuel use that exceeds the carbon intensity of
natural gas. This means that natural gas would face little to no tax burden, but coal or oil use, for example, would be
taxed at higher volumetric rates tied to their carbon content. The tax system was introduced alongside a new Mexican
global carbon credit trading platform, and large emitters can comply with the “tax” through the purchase of carbon
Certiﬁed Emissions Reductions credits.evenue
streamThird-party estimates of 2014 tax revenues of $870 m (MEX 11.5b) from tax rates ranging from MEX 10 to 50 ($0.80
to $3.80) per ton carbon dioxide (depending on fuel type), and capped at 3 percent of total sale price.aese of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- Mexico has an existing slate of green subsidies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but it is unknown if revenues from
the new carbon tax will be earmarked for these or additional spending programs.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 100 percent.
- Tax revenues are assumed to contribute to government general funds in the absence of known announced earmarks.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- No known revenue recycling tied to the carbon tax system. However, the Mexican federal government spends sig-
niﬁcant sums subsidizing end users of fuels at rates that would appear to exceed the level of carbon tax—for example,
$3.5b annually on gasoline alone.ae Juan Carlos Belausteguigoitia Rius, “Economic analyses to support the environmental ﬁscal reform,” Centro Mario Molina, May 2014.B.9 Finland carbon dioxide taxctive period 1990–ongoing
overage One of the oldest global carbon taxes, Finland's carbon tax covers most fossil fuels but does not apply to electricity
generation or commercial aviation.afevenue
stream$800m (EUR 600m) per year from a EUR 35 ($45) per ton carbon dioxide tax on the emissions embedded in the
carbon content of “heating fuels” and a EUR 60 per ton tax on the carbon content of liquid transport fuels. Carbon tax
revenues are estimated as a component of broader energy tax revenues reported by Statistics Finland (totaling EUR 4b,
$5.1b, in 2013).se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- No known earmarks to subsidize new green spending.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 50 percent.
- Finnish carbon tax revenues are transferred directly into government general funds.agRevenue Recycling: 50 percent.
- Similar to many other Nordic countries with early carbon taxes, Finland in 1997 reduced personal national and local
income taxed and employer social security contributions alongside the carbon tax implementation period, but at levels
around ﬁve times the new carbon tax revenues. Though these tax reductions were not explicitly tied to the carbon tax,ah
a representative share of revenues is ascribed here as a tax shift.af As with other the other Scandinavian carbon tax systems, Finland’s carbon tax has substantially evolved over time alongside its
broad-based energy taxes to meet EU energy tax requirements, to harmonize against the other Nordic energy tax systems, to protect
trade-exposed or other favored industries, or to target unrelated energy policy goals. Vehmas (2005), referring to these changes to the
carbon tax as “tax departures,” argues that the resultant tax structure is essentially a ﬁscal rather than environmental instrument. Jarmo
J. Carl, D. Fedor / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 50–7774Vehmas, “Energy-related taxation as an environmental policy tool—the Finnish experience 1990–2003,” Energy Policy, 2005, 33(17):2175-
2182.
ag Parkkinen in Jenny Sumner, Lori Bird, and Hillary Smith, “Carbon Taxes: A Review of Experience and Policy Design Considerations,”
NREL, December 2009.
ah Ibid.B.10 Ireland natural gas carbon tax, mineral oil tax, and solid fuel carbon taxA
C
R
U
A
C
R
Uctive period 2010–ongoing
overage Use of natural gas and oil has been covered under the carbon tax since 2010, and solid fuels since 2013, for uses not
already covered under the European Union Emissions Trading System.
evenue
stream$510m (EUR 400m) in 2012. The tax rate was set at EUR 20 ($25.50) per ton carbon dioxide from May 2014, with
limited discounts for certain traditional biomass fuels, including peat.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 12.5 percent.- Of carbon tax revenues, $66m (EUR 50m) are earmarked annually ai to fund building and low-income resident
energy efﬁciency measures, including increasing the budgets of the “Warmer Homes” and “Home Energy Savings” energy
efﬁciency retroﬁt subsidy programs and placing them under a newly formed “National Energy Retroﬁt Program”.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No other known earmarks (apart from low-income energy efﬁciency subsidies).
General funds: 87.5 percent.
- Remaining revenues are used to “support the civil service.” The tax was instituted following the 2008 global ﬁnancial
crisis in part to reduce ballooning government deﬁcits without raising income taxes.aj There is no explicit legislative link
between carbon tax revenues and other speciﬁc spending programs.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- Direct revenue recycling under the Irish carbon tax is limited. The country does institute an existing “National Fuel
Allowance Scheme” weekly cash payment to low- and ﬁxed-income households, whose rate was about EUR 20
($25.50) in 2013 and issued for only the colder portion of the year. There is no formal earmarking of carbon tax
revenues for this subsidy, whose overall demand is driven largely by employment and macroeconomic conditions,
though its continued budgetary support is arguably politically linked to the existence of the carbon tax.ak This subsidy
totaled $280m (EUR 211m) in 2013.alai “EUR 50m of the carbon tax yield will be used to fund measures such as help for households at risk of fuel poverty to make their
homes warmer. The local authorities will receive additional funding to retroﬁt the social housing stock.” Ireland Minister for Finance Brian
Lenihan, “Financial Statement of the Minister of Finance,” December 9, 2009, http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2010/2010.aspx.
aj Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Carbon Taxes Make Ireland Even Greener,” New York Times, December 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
12/28/science/earth/in-ireland-carbon-taxes-pay-off.html?_r¼0.
ak Frank Convery, Louise Dunne, and Deirdre Joyce, “Ireland’s Carbon Tax and the Fiscal Crisis: Issues in Fiscal Adjustment, Environ-
mental Effectiveness, Competitiveness, Leakage and Equity Implications,” OECD Environmental Working Papers, October 3, 2013.
al Government of Ireland, “Expenditure Report 2013,” December 2013, http://www.budget.gov.ie/Budgets/2013/2013.aspx.B.11 Japan tax for climate change mitigationctive period 2012–ongoing
overage Covers all fossil fuels with some sectoral exceptions, including agriculture and ﬁshing, domestic aviation, and railways
(exemptions are through 2017 only). Designed to be a “broad and thin” tax to avoid overburdening particular sectors of
the economy.evenue
streamTax revenues were expected to be $490m (JPY 39.1b) in 2012, rising to $3.3b (JPY 262 billion) in 2016 (at y2012
exchange rates). This was from a tax rate of JPY 192 ($1.80 at y2014 exchange rates) per ton carbon dioxide-equivalent
emissions from April 2014, increasing gradually to JPY 289 ($2.70) by late 2017. The tax is implemented as a sup-
plement to Japan's existing national energy and fuel taxes and represents less than 1 percent of those total revenues.amThe Japanese government expects the average household burden of the carbon tax to be about JPY 100 ($0.95) per
month.anse of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 100 percent.- Revenues are earmarked for spending on the promotion of “innovative domestic low-carbon technology,” including
lithium ion batteries, energy-efﬁcient equipment use by small and medium-sized businesses, and the promotion of
energy efﬁciency and renewable energy by local governments through “Green New Deal Fund” ﬁnancing. Many of these
measures were outlined in Japan's existing 2012 “4th Basic Environmental Plan.”aoThe Ministry of Finance implements the tax as an add-on to the existing upstream Petroleum and Coal tax, with which
revenues are combined and channeled through METI (Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry) or the Ministry of
A
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J. Carl, D. Fedor / Energy Policy 96 (2016) 50–77 75Environment for spending. Such revenue pooling makes the tracking of carbon tax funds difﬁcult. The Ministry of En-
vironment has begun using these newer carbon tax revenues to subsidize the country’s “Joint Crediting Mechanism” in
which the government cost-shares 50 percent of a greenhouse gas mitigation infrastructure project’s development in
return for half of that project’s global warming emission credits ($12m was spent on this program in FY2013).apJapan's Ministry of Environment described the express purpose of the carbon tax at its launch as encouraging reductions
in domestic greenhouse gas emissions. The use of carbon tax revenues for green subsidies, in addition to elevated prices
of fossil fuels from the tax itself and consumer salience of the tax's existence, was one means toward this goal.
In 2014, the Japanese Keidanren business lobby criticized management of Japanese carbon tax revenues on two grounds.
First was a lack of transparency by the government in failing to annually report the actual level of collected carbon tax
revenues. Second was a claim that, contrary to announced spending plans, carbon tax revenues were accruing in
government general funds or being rolled-over, unspent, year-to-year and not being effectively spent on greenhouse gas
mitigating research and development or energy efﬁciency subsidies.aq This criticismwas rooted in the unexpected rise in
Japanese energy prices—and combined carbon tax Petroleum and Coal Tax revenues—following the shutdown of the
country’s nuclear power ﬂeet in the wake of the 2011 Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 0 percent.
- None speciﬁed, though see above Keidanren note on actual spending patterns.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- Though other tax reforms were enacted in 2012 alongside the creation of the carbon tax, there are no known direct
household subsidies or tax swaps explicitly tied to new carbon tax revenues. Some household and commercial green
subsidies are delivered in the form of tax credits.am Japan Ministry of Environment Economic Affairs Division, “Japan's Environmental and Automobile Tax System,” 2014, http://www.
env.go.jp/policy/tax/taxes.pdf.
an Japan Ministry of Environment Economic Affairs Division, “地球温暖化対策のための税の導入 [Introduction to the tax on global
warming],” 2014, in Japanese, http://www.env.go.jp/policy/tax/about.html.
ao Japan Ministry of Environment, “環境基本計画 [Basic Environmental Plan],” April 2012, in Japanese, http://www.env.go.jp/press/ﬁles/
jp/19833.pdf.
ap Takeshi Kuramochi, “GHG Mitigation in Japan: An Overview of the Current Policy Landscape,” World Resources Institute, 2014.
aq Keidanren, “A Proposal for Near-Term Energy Policy,” October 7, 2014, http://www.keidanren.or.jp/en/policy/index07.html.B.12 France domestic consumption tax on energy products, carbon dioxide component (“contribution climat-énergie – CEE”)ctive period April 2014–ongoing
overage This recently launched French carbon tax covers the carbon content of natural gas, fuel oil, and coal that is not already
regulated under the European Union Emission Trading System. From 2015 the tax is set to extend to include transport
fuels and heating oil. Industrial entities covered under European Union Emission Trading System, as well as the ﬁshing
industry, are exempt.evenue
streamCarbon tax revenues for the abbreviated in 2014 inaugural year were expected to be $452m (EUR 340m) from a EUR 7
($9.30) per ton carbon dioxide tax rate. Revenues are estimated to climb to $3.3b (EUR 2.5b) from a EUR 14.50
($19.30) rate in 2015, and $5.3b (EUR 4b) from a EUR 22 ($29.20) per ton rate in 2016. If enacted, this would make
the French tax among the largest carbon-revenue systems globally.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 38–100 percent.- One hundred percent of 2014 French carbon tax revenues were set to be spent on the country's “green energy tran-
sition plans.” The share of green spending is set to decline rapidly over time, however, to 44 percent of 2015 revenues
and 38 percent of anticipated 2016 revenues.
Meanwhile, an existing French tax break for the production of biofuels was eliminated alongside introduction of the
carbon tax.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 0–62 percent.
- As the share of carbon tax revenues earmarked for green subsidies declines over time, the remaining (and growing)
revenues will presumably be used to support other government expenditures—no other concrete spending plans are
known to have been announced.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- Though not included in the original policy plans, a new expenditure program for carbon tax revenue was announced in
March 2014, a month before launch, to compensate low-income households for increases in natural gas utility rates due
to the inclusion of heating fuels under the carbon tax beginning in 2015. This will increase the share of revenue recycling
from the French carbon tax, as enacted.
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at Andrej Kleme
au Stefan Speck
av Stefano Pagioctive period 2010–ongoing
overage Covers use of diesel, gasoline, fuel oil, and liquid petroleum gas not already covered under the European Union Emis-
sions Trading System. The tax was originally set to expire in 2012 but has now been extended indeﬁnitely.
evenue
streamCarbon tax revenues for 2013 were estimated to be $30m (IKR 3.6b).ar The tax rate in 2014 was set at IKR 1,120 ($10)
per ton carbon dioxide, automatically rising by 3 percent annually.se of
revenuesGreen subsidies: 0 percent.- No known earmarks to subsidize new green spending.
Other earmarks: 0 percent.
- No known unrelated earmarks.
General funds: 100 percent.
- The Treasury administers Iceland's carbon-tax revenues for general expenditures. The tax was instituted as a special
revenue measure following government deﬁcits realized during the 2008 global ﬁnancial crisis.
Revenue Recycling: 0 percent.
- There are no known revenue-recycling measures or tax swaps associated with Iceland's carbon tax.ar Iceland Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs, “The Fiscal Budget Proposal for 2013,” September 2012.B.14 Other carbon tax systems
Netherlands carbon tax
The Netherlands has had a broad energy and carbon-oriented “Environmental Tax on Fuels” in place since 1992. This was expanded in
1996 with the “Regulatory Energy Tax,” which targeted residential and commercial energy users with the express purpose of inﬂuencing
their consumption behaviors through higher prices. Today, however, the carbon dioxide component of the country's broader energy and
environmental taxes appears to be only implicit and, if converted to a rate per ton emissions, is inconsistent across fuels. While Dutch
energy tax revenues reached $16.5b (EUR 12.5b) in 2013, the government does not ascribe a share for carbon dioxide.as The original
1992 energy and carbon taxes were enacted in order to raise overall government revenues and were not earmarked for other spending.
The 1996 supplementary legislation, which raised the carbon tax rate, was explicitly tied to simultaneous reductions in the existing
personal income tax, corporate income tax, and employer social security contributions, with tax-free allowances extended.Slovenia Decree on Tax on Emissions of Carbon Dioxide
Slovenia was the ﬁrst Eastern European country to introduce a carbon-revenue systemwhen it launched a tax in 1997 at a headline rate
of 1,000 Slovene tolar ($6.26) per ton carbon dioxide. The rate was tripled the following year, resulting in a signiﬁcant restructuring of
the tax to include numerous end-user- and fuel-speciﬁc exemptions and discounts to the tax rate. These exemptions, which implemented
other adjustments to the value-added tax rate, are so broad and seemingly haphazard as to question whether this tax can be considered a
true carbon price as opposed to a fuel excise tax.at Revenues for 2004 were reported to be roughly $75 m (1.5 trillion Slovene tolar) with
one-third of revenues directed toward green subsidies (energy efﬁciency and other emission mitigation) with the remaining funds used in
general funs without earmark.auCosta Rica Carbon Tax
The Costa Rica government received tax revenues of $200 m per year from a levy of 3.5 percent of the market value of individual
fossil fuels, covering all fossil fuel use. Though referred to as a “carbon tax,” this price-based tax, which has been in place since 1997, does
not appear to be tied to the carbon content of fuels and so is in function a more conventional energy sales tax. Thirty-three percent of tax
revenues were originally earmarked for use by Costa Rica's State Environmental Services Program, which primarily funds forest con-
servation programs. After years of consistent underpayment by the central government, however, this share was reduced to 3.5 percent of
“carbon tax” revenues in 2001.av The government now retains the remaining “carbon tax” funds for general budgetary use.ReferencesAckerman, Bruce, Stewart, Richard, 1985. Reforming Environmental Law. Stanf. Law
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